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Abstract
The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game
where players may or may not have access to more private information is characterized and shown to be
equivalent to the set of an incomplete information version of correlated equilibrium, which we call Bayes
correlated equilibrium. We describe a partial order on many player information structures - which we
call individual su¢ ciency - under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.
We discuss the relation of the solution concept to alternative denitions of correlated equilibrium in
incomplete information games and of the partial order on information structures to others, including
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1 Introduction
Fix an incomplete information game. What can we say about what might happen in equilibrium if players
may or may not have access to more information? We show that behavior corresponds to a Bayes Nash
equilibrium for some extra information that the players might observe if and only if it is an incomplete
information version of correlated equilibrium that we dub Bayes correlated equilibrium. Aumann (1974),
(1987) introduced the notion of correlated equilibrium in games with complete information and a number
of denitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information have been suggested, notably
in Forges (1993). Our denition is driven by a di¤erent motivation from the earlier literature and is weaker
than the weakest denition of incomplete information correlated equilibrium (the Bayesian solution in
Forges (1993)), because it allows play to be correlated with states that are not known by any player.
While this characterization is a straightforward variation and reinterpretation of existing results in
the literature, we believe there are a number of distinct reasons why this characterization is of particular
interest. First, it allows the analyst to identify properties of equilibrium outcomes that are going to
hold independent of features of the information structure that the analyst does not know; in this sense,
properties that hold in all Bayes correlated equilibria of a given incomplete information game constitute
robust predictions. Second, it provides a way to partially identify parameters of the underlying economic
environment independently of knowledge of the information structure. Third, it provides an indirect
method of identifying socially or privately optimal information structures without explicitly working with
a space of all information structures. In Bergemann and Morris (2011b), we illustrate these uses of the
characterization result in a particular class of continuum player, linear best response games, focussing on
normal distributions of types and actions and symmetric information structures and outcomes. While
special, these games and equilibria can be used to model many economic phenomena of interest. In this
paper, we work with general (nite player, nite action and nite state) games, and illustrate these uses
with examples.
We distinguish between the "basic game" from the "information structure" in the denition of the
incomplete information game. The basic game refers to the set of actions, the set of payo¤ states, the
utility functions of the players, and the common prior over the payo¤ states. The information structure
refers to the type space of the game, which is generated by a mapping from the payo¤ states to a probability
distribution over types, or signals. The separation between the basic game and the information structure
enables us to ask how changes in the information structure a¤ect the equilibrium set for a xed basic game.
A second contribution of the paper and the main formal contribution is that (i) we introduce a natural,
statistical, partial order on information structures - called individual su¢ ciency - that captures intuitively
when one information structure contains more information than another; and (ii) we show that the set
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of Bayes correlated equilibria shrinks in all games if and only if the informativeness of the information
structure increases.
A one player version of an information structure is an "experiment" in the sense studied by Blackwell
(1951), (1953). An experiment consists of a set of signals and a mapping from states to probability distri-
butions over signals. Suppose that we are interested in comparing a pair of experiments. A combination
of the two experiments is a new experiment where a pair of signals - one from each experiment - is observed
and the marginal probability over signals from each of the original experiments corresponds to the original
distribution. One experiment is su¢ cient for another if it is possible to construct a combined experiment
such that the signal in the former experiment is a su¢ cient statistic for the signal in the latter experiment.
Our partial order on (many player) information structures is a natural generalization of su¢ ciency. One
information structure is individually su¢ cient for another if there exists a combined information structure
where each players signal from the former information structure is a su¢ cient statistic for his beliefs over
both states and otherssignals in the combined information structure. This partial order has a couple
of key properties - each generalizing well known properties in the one player case - that suggest that it
is the "right" ordering on (many player) information structures. First, two information structures are
individually su¢ cient for each other if and only if they are "higher order belief equivalent" in the sense
that they correspond to the same probability distribution over beliefs and higher order beliefs about states
(for any given prior on states). Second, one information structure is individually su¢ cient for another if
and only if it is possible to start with the latter information structure and then have the players observe
some extra signal, so that the expanded information structure is higher order belief equivalent to the former
information structure.
Blackwells theorem showed that if one experiment was su¢ cient for another, then making decisions
based on the former experiment allows a decision maker to attain a richer set of outcomes. In particular,
although it was not the form in which Blackwell stated his result, economists have focussed on the impli-
cation that one experiment is su¢ cient for another if and only if it allows a decision maker to attain a
higher level of ex ante utility in any decision problem, so that it is "more valuable". Thus we will argue
that Blackwells theorem showed the equivalence of a "statistical ordering" on experiments (su¢ ciency)
and a "feasibility ordering" (more valuable than). In this paper, we introduce (in the many player case)
an "incentive ordering" on information structures: we say that an information structure is more incentive
constrained than another if it gives rise to a smaller set of Bayes correlated equilibria. Our main result,
stated in this language, is that one information structure is more incentive constrained than another if
and only if the former is individually su¢ cient for the latter. Thus we show the equivalence between a
statistical ordering and an incentive ordering. In order to understand the relation to Blackwells theorem,
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we show that our main result, restricted to the one person case, has a natural interpretation and can be
seen as an extension of Blackwells theorem. And we also describe a feasibility ordering on many player
information structures which is equivalent to individual su¢ ciency and more incentive constrained than.
Taken together, our main result and discussion of the relation to Blackwells theorem, highlight the dual
role of information. By making more outcomes feasible, more information allows more outcomes to occur.
By adding incentive constraints, more information restricts the set of outcomes that can occur. We show
that the same partial order - individual su¢ ciency, reducing to su¢ ciency in the one player case - captures
both roles of information simultaneously.
Our characterization result also has a one player analogue. Consider a decision maker who has access
to an experiment, but may have access to more information. What can we say about the joint distribution
of actions and states that might result in a given decision problem? We show that they are one person
Bayes correlated equilibria. Such one person Bayes correlated equilibria have already arisen in a variety
of contexts. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) consider the problem of cheap talk with commitment. In
order to understand the behavior that a sender/speaker can induce a receiver/decision maker to choose, we
might rst want to characterize all outcomes that can arise for some committed cheap talk (independent of
the objectives of the speaker). This, in our language, is the set of one person Bayes correlated equilibria.1
Caplin and Martin (2011) study experiments with incomplete perception of a set of physical signals. Since
they do not know how the decision maker perceives, they interpret the subject as if she has observed more
or less information unknown to the experimenter, and thus outcomes are, in our language, one person
Bayes correlated equilibria.
There is a literature studying and comparing alternative denitions of correlated equilibrium under in-
complete information, with the papers of Forges (1993), (2006) being particularly important. A standard
assumption in that literature - which we dub "join feasibility" - is that play can only depend on the joint
information of all the players. This restriction makes sense under the maintained assumption that corre-
lated equilibrium is intended to capture the role of correlation of the playersactions but not unexplained
correlation with the state of nature. Our di¤erent motivation leads us to allow such unexplained correla-
tion. Liu (2011) also relaxes the join feasibility assumption, but imposes a belief invariance assumption
(introduced and studied in combination with join feasibility in Forges (2006)), requiring that, from each
players point of view, the action recommendation that he receives from the mediator does not change his
beliefs about otherstypes and the state. Intuitively, the belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibria of
Liu (2011) capture the implications of common knowledge of rationality and a xed information structure,
1As Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), there is a close connection with work of Aumann and Maschler (1995), on Nash
equilibria of innitely repeated zero sum games with one sided uncertainty and without discounting, as it is as if the informed
play can commit to reveal only certain information about the state.
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while our Bayes correlated equilibria capture the implications of common knowledge of rationality and the
fact that the player have observed at least the signals in the information structure. In particular, the set of
Bayes correlated equilibria for a xed information structure correspond to the set of belief invariant Bayes
correlated equilibria of that information structure and all more informed ones. Liu (2011) introduces the
notion of an "incomplete information correlating device" and shows that (i) belief invariant Bayes corre-
lated equilibria are invariant to adding a correlation device; and (ii) two information structures are higher
order belief equivalent if and only if they can be mapped into each other via correlating devices. Thus
two information structures are individually su¢ cient for each other if and only if they are equivalent to a
non-redundant type space plus a correlating device.
Two papers - Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010), (2011) - have examined comparative statics of how
changing the information structure e¤ects the set of predictions that can be made about playersactions,
under Bayes Nash equilibrium and denitions of incomplete information correlated equilibrium stronger
than Bayes correlated equilibrium. In the language of our paper, they construct statistical orderings on
information structures and show how these orderings are relevant for - in Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya
(2010) - feasibility orderings and - in Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2011) - incentive orderings. Our
ordering - individual su¢ ciency - is a more complete variation on the orderings they construct and we
will note how some of our results can be proved by adapting their arguments. Two crucial distinctions
are the following. First, because they work with solution concepts that maintain join feasibility, the
relevant orderings are always renements of su¢ ciency, i.e., they require playersjoint information in one
information structure to be su¢ cient for their joint information in the other structure, and then impose
additional restrictions. By construction, individual su¢ ciency is a many player analogue of su¢ ciency but
neither implies nor is implied by su¢ ciency of joint information. Second, because they work with solution
concepts that include feasibility restrictions, the results relating information structure orders to incentive
constraints in Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2011) are weaker than ours: they characterize when two
information structures support the same set of equilibria in all games, but not when one information
structure supports a larger or smaller set.
We exposit our results by rst presenting at length the one player version of the results in Section 2.
As discussed above, we believe that the one player version of our results is of independent interest, relates
together a number of results in the literature in an interesting way, and allows us to present an interesting
extension and interpretation of Blackwells theorem. And we can present our results for the one player
case in a way that the many player generalization follows easily.
However, this expository material is not necessary for the remainder of the paper, and it is possible to
go straight to the general many player analysis in Section 3 on page 18. In Section 3, we provide a complete
Bayes Correlated Equilibrium February 4, 2013 6
analysis of the general case with nitely many agents. In Section 4, we o¤er a many player generalization of
the su¢ ciency ordering, dubbed individual su¢ ciency, for which we can establish an equivalence between
the incentive based ordering and the statistical ordering. We thus report results on comparing information
structures in many agent environments. In Section 5, we study a class of binary action basic games and
binary signal information structures, and use it to illustrate all our results. In Section 6, we explain how
the solution concept we dub "Bayes correlated equilibrium" relates to the literature, in particular Forges
(1993), (2006). Section 7 concludes and contains a discussion of the relation to the literature on the value
of information.
2 The Special Case: One Player
We rst preview our results by presenting the one player case. There is a nite set of states, , and we
write  for a typical state. A decision problem G consists of (1) a nite set of actions A; (2) a utility
function u : A! R; and (3) a strictly positive prior  2 ++ (). Thus G = (A; u;  ). An experiment
S consists of (1) a nite set of signals T ; and (2) a signal distribution  :  ! (T ). Thus S = (T; ).
Two experiments play an important role. The null experiment S has T = ftg and  (tj) = 1 for all  2 .
Thus the null experiment provides no information. The complete experiment S has T =  and
 (tj) =
8<: 1, if t = ,0, otherwise,
for all  2 . The pair (G;S) is a (one player) game of incomplete information.
Our terminology in this section will be often be non-standard for the one person case as it is chosen
to emphasize the link with the many player case that follows.
2.1 Dening Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
A decision rule is a mapping
 : T ! (A) . (1)
Note that it is allowed to depend on states as well as signals. We will be interested in the implications of
decision rules if signals are not observed. Call a mapping
 : ! (A) (2)
specifying the probability distribution over actions conditional on states a random choice rule. Random
choice rule  is induced by decision rule  ifX
t2T
 (tj) (ajt; ) =  (aj) (3)
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for all a 2 A and  2 .
Now suppose the action was being chosen by a rational decision maker who was aware of information
structure S (i.e., observed a signal t 2 T ), was interested in maximizing expected utility but perhaps knew
more. What restrictions beyond consistency would this impose on the decision rule?
Denition 1 (Obedience)
Decision rule  is obedient for (G;S) ifX
2
 () (tj) (ajt; )u (a; ) 
X
2





for all a; a0 2 A and t 2 T .
Denition 2 (Bayes Correlated Equilibrium)
Decision rule  is a Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE) of (G;S) if it is obedient for (G;S).
Random choice rule  is a BCE random choice rule for (G;S) if it is induced by a BCE . We are
interested in the joint distribution of a triple of random variables, (a; t; ). An elementary property of
the conditional probabilities of a triple of random variables was stated as Theorem 7 of Blackwell (1951).
This property, a conditional independence property, will play a central role in our analysis, as it did in
Blackwells and other related work. Because this property, and terminology that we will use to describe
it, will appear in a variety of di¤erent contexts in this paper, we will nd it useful to present it abstractly
next.
2.2 A Statistical Digression: Blackwell Triples
Suppose that we are interested in a triple of variables, (x; y; z) 2 X  Y  Z, and that we are given a
probability distribution on the product space, P 2 (X  Y  Z). We will abuse notion by using P to
refer to marginal probabilities, writing P (x) for P (fxg  Y  Z) and P (x; y) for P (fxg  fyg  Z); and
conditional probabilities, writing P (xjy; z) for
P (xjy; z) = P (x; y; z)
P (y; z)
if P (y; z) > 0; and
P (xjy) = P (x; y)
P (y)
if P (y) > 0. We will say that the probability of x conditional on y is independent of z (under P ) if
P (xjy; z) = P (xjy)
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for all z 2 Z whenever P (y; z) > 0. Now we have the following statistical fact concerning a triple of
random variables.
Lemma 1 (Conditional Independence)
The following statements are equivalent
1. The probability P (xjy; z) is independent of z.
2. The probability P (zjy; x) is independent of x.
3. P (x; y; z) = P (y)P (xjy)P (zjy) if P (x; y; z) > 0.
Proof. (3) immediately implies (1) and (2). To see that (1) implies (3), observe that if P (y; z) > 0,
P (y; z)P (xjy; z) = P (y)P (zjy)P (xjy; z) , by denition
= P (y)P (zjy)P (xjy) , by (1).
A symmetric argument shows that (2) implies (3).
When these statements are true, we will say that the ordered variables (x; y; z) are a Blackwell triple
(under P ). Blackwell (1951) observed that the above relationship can be rephrased as saying that a Markov
chain, namely P (xjy; z) = P (xjy), is also a Markov chain in reverse, namely P (zjy; x) = P (zjy).2
2.3 Foundations of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
We want to formalize the idea that Bayes correlated equilibria describe all behavior that might arise from
a decision maker with access to experiment S but also perhaps more information. First, we review the
standard approach to analyzing rational behavior where the information structure is fully described by
experiment S.
Denition 3 (Belief Invariance)
A decision rule  is belief invariant for (G;S) if for all  2 ; t 2 T such that  () (tj) > 0,  (ajt; ) is
independent of .
In other words, if the pair (t; ) has a strictly positive probability:  () (tj) > 0, then the conditional
probability  (ajt; ) only depends on t and not on  :
 (ajt) ,  (ajt; ) . (5)
2For this reason, Torgersen (1991) p. 345, refers to the triple (x; y; z) as a "Markov triple". As the term "Markov triple"
is commonly used to refer to solutions of Markov Diophantine equations, we prefer "Blackwell triple".
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This property reects the standard restriction in Bayesian decision making, that a decision maker who
has access only to the experiment S, cannot directly condition his actions on the state , but rather has
to condition his decision on the signal t. The belief invariance condition is imposed as a restriction only
on strictly positive probability events,  () (tj) > 0, under the information structure S. But as we
could always extend the restriction to zero probability events,  () (tj) = 0, without a¤ecting either
the obedience condition, see (4), or the induced random choice rule, see (3), we shall henceforth omit the
positive probability qualier,  () (tj) > 0; when discussing belief invariance.
Now supposed that we x any prior  2 ++ () and write  (jt; a) for implied probability of 
conditional on signal t and action a, so that
 (jt; a) =






tje ajt;e > 0 for some e 2 .
Now (t; a; ) are a Blackwell triple as dened in Section 2.2 and, by Lemma 1, the conditional in-
dependence lemma, an equivalent statement of the belief invariance property is then that  (jt; a) is
independent of a. This statement motivates the name: it states that observing the chosen action a does
not reveal any information about the state  beyond that contained in the signal t. This terminology was
introduced in the many player context by Forges (2006).
Thus decision rule  could arise from a decision maker with access only to experiment S if it is belief
invariant. Thus a standard description of optimal behavior in this setting corresponds to requiring belief
invariance and obedience.
Denition 4 (Bayes Nash Equilibrium)
Decision rule  is a Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE) for (G;S) if it is obedient and belief invariant for
(G;S).
Random choice rule  is a BNE random choice rule if it is induced by a BNE decision rule. We label
this a "Bayes Nash equilibrium" as this will be one many player counterpart of this denition. However,
we will see that there are multiple ways of extending belief invariance to the many player case, so Bayes
Nash equilibria will not be the only natural counterpart of this denition.3
We want to ask what can happen if the decision maker observes more information. To discuss this, we
must introduce language to talk about comparing and combining experiments. If we have two experiments
3 In Section 6, we will see that, in the one player case, the set of BNE random choice rules equals the set of Bayesian
solutions, the set of belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibria and the set of belief invariant Bayesian solutions.
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S = (T; ) and S0 = (T 0; 0), we will say that experiment S = (T ; ) is a combination of experiments S
and S0 if
















for each t0 2 T 0 and  2 .
Note that this denition places no restrictions on whether signals t 2 T and t0 2 T 0 are independent or
correlated, conditional on , under . Thus any pair of experiments S and S0 will have many combined
experiments. An experiment S is said to be an expansion of S if S is a combination of S and some other
experiment S0.
Now we have the following result motivating our analysis of Bayes correlated equilibria:
Proposition 1 (Epistemic Relationship)
Random choice rule  is a BNE random choice rule for (G;S) for some expansion S of S if and only if
 is a BCE random choice rule of (G;S) :
We omit formal proofs in this section as they are special cases of the many player analysis that follows.
2.4 Comparing Experiments
Our denition and foundation for Bayes correlated equilibrium clearly suggests that more information must
reduce the set of BCE random choice rules by giving rise to more incentive constraints. Thus it is natural
to ask what is the right "incentive ordering" on experiments in general that captures how more information
reduces the set of possible obedient random choice rules. But what exactly is the right denition of "more
information" in this context?
Blackwell (1951), (1953) introduced a famous partial ordering on experiments. His focus was not on
incentive constraints. He showed the equivalence between two orderings on experiments, a "statistical"
ordering - capturing the statistical relationship between experiments - and a "feasibility" ordering - cap-
turing which experiment allowed the decision maker to attain more outcomes. In this Section, we will
describe an incentive ordering and show its equivalence to the statistical and feasibility orderings which
Blackwell showed were equivalent. While these distinctions may seem subtle in the single player case, we
nd this trichotomy into incentive, feasibility and statistical orderings very helpful in the many player case
and therefore it is useful to develop intuition here.
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An Incentive Ordering of Experiments Writing BCE (G;S) for the set of BCE random choice rules
of (G;S), we want to study the following ordering on experiments:
Denition 5 (Incentive Constrained)
Experiment S is more incentive constrained than experiment S0 if, for all decision problems G,





A Feasibility Ordering of Experiments A key use of information is in enabling more state dependence
of behavior. Thus we are interested in which random choice rules are feasible in a given experiment.
Denition 6 (Feasible Random Choice Rule)
A random choice rule  is feasible for (G;S) if it is induced by a decision rule  which is belief invariant
for (G;S).
Our preferred feasibility ordering directly formalizes this idea. Writing F (G;S) for the set of random
choice rules that are feasible for (G;S), we have:
Denition 7 (More Permissive)
Experiment S is more permissive than experiment S0 if, for all decision problems G,





Notice that while we nd it useful to dene feasibility and thus permissiveness in terms of decision
problems, recall that a decision problem G = (A; u;  ) consists of a set of actions, utility function and
prior, and that our denition of feasibility, and thus permissiveness, uses only the action set and thus is a
"pure" feasibility ordering that does not refer to utility functions.
Blackwell (1951), (1953) used a di¤erent ordering to capture feasibility: one experiment was "more
informative" than another if, in any decision problem, it allowed the decision maker to achieve a larger set
of mappings from states to state contingent expected utilities. In particular, in our language, any belief
invariant decision rule  induces a random choice rule  which implies that the expectation of u in state




 (aj)u (a; ) .
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and an element w 2 W (G;S) is a vector, denoted by w = (w ())2 2 Rjj, where jj is the cardinality
of the state space  . Each entry in the vector represents the expected utility of the agent in some state
 2 . Thus Blackwells denition written in our language is:
Denition 8 (More Informative)






This denition does not take a position on whether high expectations of u or low expectations of u are
a "good thing;" it only uses the utility function to map feasibility into a di¤erent space, namely the space
of expected utility vectors. We observe that the denition of "more informative" invokes the action set
and the utility function, but it does not use the prior of the decision problem.
Economists have tended to focus on yet another feasibility ordering (see Marschak and Miyasawa
(1968)). Write w (G;S) for the highest ex ante utility that a decision maker can attain with a belief
invariant decision rule (and thus a feasible random choice rule),










 ()  (aj)u (a; )
9=; .
Denition 9 (More Valuable)
Experiment S is more valuable than S0 if, for all decision problems G,





This ordering also uses the prior  on states in the denition, as well as the action set A and the utility
function u used in Blackwells denition of "more informative" relation. It is important to note that this
denition does not refer to the optimality (or obedience) of the decision rules generating it.
Now we have that these three feasibility orderings are all equivalent:
Proposition 2 The following statements are equivalent
1. Experiment S is more permissive than S0
2. Experiment S is more informative than S0
3. Experiment S is more valuable than S0
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It follows from the denitions that (1) implies (2), which in turn implies (3). A separating hyperplane
argument shows that (3) or (2) imply (1). Thus this forms a signicant step in the argument for Blackwells
Theorem as usually stated. We choose to emphasize the conceptual similarity between the three orderings,
as "more permissive" captures the idea that more outcomes are feasible if there is more information. While
not the focus of this paper, for completeness we will state a many player version of Proposition 2 in the
Appendix 8.1 and provide an elementary proof.
A Statistical Ordering on Experiments We can state Blackwells classic statistical ordering on ex-
periments concisely and intuitively using the language of combined experiments:
Denition 10 (Su¢ cient Experiment)
Experiment S = (T; ) is su¢ cient for experiment S0 = (T 0; 0) if there exists a combination of experiments











We like this denition because it captures the intuitive idea of "su¢ ciency" and is a version of the
denition that extends to the many player case in a natural way. A version of this denition was used in
Marschak and Miyasawa (1968). Another way of stating it is that (; t; t0) form a Blackwell triple, so that,
by the conditional independence lemma, an equivalent way of stating (6) is that for some (or, equivalently,























for all t0 2 T 0 and  2 .
Finally, notice that the belief invariance property can be expressed in the language of su¢ ciency. A
set of actions A and a random choice rule  together dene an experiment (A; ). Now random choice rule
 can be induced by a belief invariant decision rule if and only if experiment S is su¢ cient for experiment
(A; ).
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2.5 Equivalence of Three Orderings
Now we can report the equivalence of statistical, incentive and feasibility orderings.
Theorem 1 (Equivalence)
The following statements are equivalent:
1. Experiment S is su¢ cient for experiment S0
2. Experiment S is more incentive constrained than experiment S0
3. Experiment S is more permissive than experiment S0
Blackwell (1951), (1953) showed the equivalence of "is su¢ cient for" to "is more informative than".
Blackwells theorem is thus implied by Proposition 2 and Theorem 1. Our main result will be a many
player generalization of Theorem 1 and we will present a formal proof for that more general case. The
proof of the equivalence of "is su¢ cient for" and "is more permissive than" is straightforward. (1) can be
shown to imply (2) by using su¢ ciency to show that the obedience constraints for (G;S0) can always be
expressed as averages of obedience constraints for (G;S), and are thus less restrictive. This is how the
formal argument will work in the many player generalization. There is also a simple argument to show
that (2) implies (3) in the one person case, although this argument does not generalize to the many player
case.4 The simple argument for the one player case goes as follows. If (3) fails, S is not more valuable
than S0. Thus there is a decision problem G with v (G;S0) > v (G;S). Thus there is a BCE random choice
rule  2 BCE (G;S) which gives ex ante utility v (G;S). But any BCE random choice rule of v (G;S0)
gives ex ante utility at least v (G;S0), and thus  =2 BCE (G;S0). Thus BCE (G;S)  BCE (G;S0) and
so (2) fails. The su¢ ciency ordering is a partial order, with many experiments not comparable. We will
later, in particular in Section 4.4, note some elementary and well known properties of this ordering, as
these properties we will have interesting many player generalizations.
2.6 Leading Example
We will use the following example to illustrate ideas in this section. There are two states  = f0; 1g.
Let G be given by A = fa0; a1g, a uniform prior on states and a payo¤ function such that the payo¤ is 1





4We are grateful to Bruno Strulovici for suggesting this argument.
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where the rows correspond to actions and columns correspond to states. Consider a family of information






. Thus  : ! (T ) can be summarized in the following table where rows correspond to signals
and columns correspond to states:
 0 1
t0 q 1  q
t1 1  q q
(8)
We can illustrate Bayes correlated equilibrium using this example. A decision rule in the example is a
vector of four numbers (00; 01; 10; 11) where ij is the probability of choosing action 0 in state i when
the signal is tj . The dening inequality for obedience, given earlier by (4), generates in the present binary


















2q (1  11) 
1
2 (1  q) (1  01)
(9)
A random choice rule in the example is a pair of numbers (0; 1) where i is the probability that
action 0 is taken when the state is i. Now (0; 1) is a BCE random choice rule if and only if there exist
(00; 01; 10; 11) satisfying the obedience inequalities (9) with
0 = q00 + (1  q)01
1 = (1  q)10 + q11
(10)
Clearly, the obedience conditions imply that 0  1, which we can infer by summing any two inequalities
of (9) for a given signal tj . But if the signal contains any information at all, i.e. q > 1=2, then the
inequality can be strengthened; using the symmetry of the binary signal, we can sum the above inequalities
for (a0; t0) and (a1; t1), or equivalently, (a1; t0) and (a0; t1) to nd that the set of BCE outcomes with a
given information structure Sq is completely described by:
BCE (q) = f(0; 1) j0  1 + 2q   1g .
This set is illustrated in Figure 1 for di¤erent values of q.
Insert Figure 1 here
Next, we can identify the Bayes Nash equilibrium. In our example, for any q > 12 , the unique BNE is
to choose action a0 given signal t0 and action a1 given signal t1, and thus the unique BNE random choice
rule has (0; 1) = (q; 1  q). Note that this is a boundary point of the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.
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We see in Figure 1 that the set of BCE random choice rules shrinks as the informativeness of the
experiments as represented by q improves. It visually suggests that the incentive ordering of the experiments
suggested in Denition 5 indeed captures the idea that more information reduces the set of obedient random
choice maps.
It might be helpful to state the results of our leading example in an interpretation taken from Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011). Suppose that states 0 and 1 correspond to the innocence or guilt of a suspect
and that the decision maker is a juror who gets utility 1 from delivering the correct verdict and utility 0
from delivering an incorrect verdict. We noted earlier that a random choice rule (0; 1) is a BCE random
choice rule under information structure Sq if and only if
0  1 + 2q   1. (11)
Proposition 1 says that for any such (0; 1), we can nd a expansion of Sq such that there is a Bayes
Nash equilibrium inducing (0; 1). For example, suppose that q = 34 , 1 = 0 and 0 =
1
2 . Consider
the expanded experiment under which, in addition to observing S 3
4
, if the juror observed t0 (i.e., a signal
implying that the suspect was innocent with probability 23) and if the suspect was in fact innocent (i.e., the
true state was 0), then with conditional probability 23 the juror observed an additional announcement that
the suspect was in fact innocent. Under this information structure, it is optimal for him to acquit only if he
observes the additional signal. If he does not receive an additional signal, Bayes rule calculations show that
he attaches probability 12 to the suspect being guilty and it is weakly optimal for him to convict. Under
this scenario, the suspect is never acquitted if guilty (i.e., 1 = 0) and acquitted with only probability 12 if
innocent.
We presented Proposition 1 as a one player version of an incomplete information generalization of the
characterization of the correlated equilibrium due to Aumann (1987). This result has many uses and many
interpretations, some of which have already been developed and studied.
Suppose (to continue the Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) interpretation), an unscrupulous district
attorney (DA) was interested in acquitting as rarely as possible; the DA would thus want to minimize the







If the district attorney could pick a Bayes correlated equilibrium, his problem would be to minimize (12)
subject to (11), and thus, if q = 34 , he would set 1 = 0 and 0 =
1
2 and achieve an acquittal rate of
1
4 .
Proposition 1 says that if the DA is unable to prevent the juror observing his initial signal under Sq but
is able to control what additional information the juror can observe (and commit to this rule ex ante),
then it is as if the DA can pick a BCE and we described above the additional disclosure rule that supports
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his most preferred outcome as a BNE. Thus the set of BCE characterize the set of outcomes that can
be achieved by "Bayesian persuasion". Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) focus on the case where there is
no prior information, or, equivalently, the information structure is the null experiment S = (T ; ) where
T = ftg and  (tj) = 1 for all . Note that in this case, the obedience condition becomes (omitting
dependence of the decision rule on the null signal)X
2








for all a; a0 2 A. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) give both a general characterization of BCE outcomes
(in a more general case with innite actions) and a number of applications.5
Caplin and Martin (2011) introduce a theoretical and empirical framework for analyzing imperfect
perception. If we, as outside observers, do not know how decision makers interpret cues provided to them,
it is as if they may have observed additional information but we do not know what it is. In particular,
they test whether "ideal data sets" are consistent with rationality. Ideal data sets are equivalent in our
language to random choice rules for the null experiment S.6 Caplin and Martin (2011) introduce tests of
rationality, i.e., obedience, in this setting
Chwe (2006) studied the implications of incentive constraints without ruling out the possibility of
decision makers having access to additional information, and in this sense studies implications of Bayes
correlated equilibria. In particular, x two actions, a and a0 and consider two random variables dened
















8<: 1, if a0 = a;0, if a0 6= a:
Chwe (2006) shows (in our language) that if a decision rule  is obedient under the null experiment (i.e.,
satises (13)), then there is a non-negative covariance between a and Ia under the measure on A  
induced by .
We suggested three di¤erent orderings of experiments above and indeed we can visually represent them
just we represented the incentive ordering. In present example, the set of feasible random choice rules is
5 Rayo and Segal (2010) analyze a related problem, but one where the decision maker does have prior information. Their
analysis does not quite t our framework because the person designing the information structure does not have access to the
decision makers prior information.
6We are grateful to Jonathan Weinstein for bringing this connection to our attention.
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equal to set of (0; 1) in the convex hull of
(0; 0) ; (q; 1  q) ; (1  q; q) ; (1; 1) :
The feasible random choice rules simply express the possible mappings  : ! (A) that can be generated
from belief invariant decision rule. These four points correspond, respectively, to the decision rules, never
acquit, acquit only if innocent, acquit only if guilty and always acquit. In other words, the agent can match
the action ai with the received signal ti, or reverse match action aj to signal ti with i 6= j, this generates
the points (q; 1  q) and (1  q; q). Alternatively, he can choose not respond to the signal and choose a
constant (pure) action, thus generating (0; 0) and (1; 1). Now, given the experiment, the only remaining
degree of freedom is to randomize over these four pure action, thus generating the convex hull. In Figure
2, we plot the set of BCE random choice rules and the set of feasible random choice rules for q = 58 .
Insert Figure 2 here.
Observe that these sets intersect at the unique BNE random choice rule. This will be a generic property
in the one player case, but we will see that it does not extend to the many player case. In Figure 3, we see
how the set of feasible random choice rules expand as q increases to 78 and the set of BCE random choice
rules shrinks.
Insert Figure 3 here.
Finally, we notice that in Figure 2 and 3 we visually represented the feasibility constraints and the
incentive constraints, thus invoking two of three equivalent criteria of Theorem 1. But in light of the
earlier observation that the belief invariance property can be expressed by the su¢ ciency, and now the
above equivalence result, it follows that the feasible set of the random choice rules is at the same time
representing the (binary) information structures for which Sq is su¢ cient. In particular, the random choice
rule that represents the BNE in either Figure 2 or 3 can be taken to represent the symmetric (and binary)
information structure Sq, interpreting the action as the signal. We can then ask for which binary, but
not necessarily symmetric information structures is Sq su¢ cient. The answer is simply all the binary
information structures S = (T; ) of the form:
 0 1
t0 0 1  1
t1 1  0 1
where (v0; v1) is feasible under Sq. We also see the set of feasible random choice rules is independent of the
prior whereas the set of BCE uses the prior in the computation of the boundary. In particular the slope of
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boundary is determined by the ratio of the probability of the two states, Pr (0) =Pr (1), which is 1 under
the uniform prior considered here.
3 The General Case: Many Players
3.1 Denition of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
There are I players, 1; 2; :::; I, and we write i for a typical player. There is a nite set of states, , and we
write  for a typical state. A basic game G consists of (1) for each player i, a nite set of actions Ai and a





i=1 ;  

. An information structure S consists of (1) for each player i, a nite set of








Together, the basic game G and the information structure S dene a standard incomplete information
game. While we use di¤erent notation, this division of an incomplete information game into the "basic
game" and the "information structure" has been used in the literature (see, for example, Lehrer, Rosenberg,
and Shmaya (2010)).
Two extreme information structures play an important role. The null information structure S has
T i = ftig for all i and  (tj) = 1 for all  2 . Thus the null information structure provides no
information. The complete information structure S has T i =  for all i and
 (tj) =
8<: 1, if ti =  for all i;0; otherwise,
for all  2 .
A decision rule in the incomplete information game (G;S) is a mapping
 : T ! (A) :
One way to mechanically understand the notion of the decision rule in a many player environment is to
view the decision rule as the strategy of a mediator who observes the realization of  2  chosen according
to  and the realization of t 2 T according to  (j); and then picked an action prole a 2 A, and
privately announced to player i the draw of ai. For players to have an incentive to follow the mediators
recommendation in this scenario, it would have to be the case that the recommended action ai was always
preferred to any other action a0i conditional on the signal ti that player i had received and his knowledge
of the recommended action ai. This is reected in the following incentive compatibility condition.
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Denition 11 (Obedience)
Decision rule  is obedient for (G;S) if, for each i = 1; :::; I, ti 2 Ti and ai 2 Ai, we haveX
a i;t i;











for all a0i 2 Ai.
Denition 12 (Bayes Correlated Equilibrium)
A decision rule  is a Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE) of (G;S) if it is obedient for (G;S).
If there is complete information, i.e., if  is a singleton, and S is the null information structure,
then this denition reduces to the Aumann (1987) denition of correlated equilibrium. We provide our
motivation for studying this particular generalization next. We postpone until Section 6 a discussion of
how this relates to (and why it is weaker than) other denitions in the literature on incomplete information
correlated equilibrium.
3.2 Foundations of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
In this section, we provide our rationale for being interested in Bayes correlated equilibria. Consider an
analyst who knows that
1. The basic game G describes actions, payo¤ functions depending on states, and a prior distribution
on states.
2. The players observe at least information structure S, but may observe more.
3. The full, common prior, information structure is common certainty among the players.
4. The playersactions follow a Bayes Nash equilibrium.
What can she deduce about the joint distribution of actions, signals from the information structure S
and states? In this section, we will formalize this question and show that all she can deduce is that the
distribution will be a Bayes correlated equilibrium of (G;S).
We rst review the standard approach to analyzing incomplete information games. A (behavioral)
strategy for player i in the incomplete information game (G;S) is i : Ti ! (Ai). The following is the
standard denition of Bayes Nash equilibrium in this setting.
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Denition 13 (Bayes Nash Equilibrium)
A strategy prole  is a Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE) of (G;S) if for each i = 1; 2; :::; I, ti 2 Ti and
ai 2 Ai with i (aijti) > 0, we have
X
a i;t i;












1Aui   a0i; a i ;  ,
for each a0i 2 Ai.
A Bayes Nash equilibrium  is a prole of strategies. To compare solution concepts, we would like to
discuss the decision rule corresponding to a BNE. Decision rule  is said to be induced by strategy prole
 if







for each a 2 A, t 2 T and  2 .
Denition 14 (Bayes Nash Equilibrium Decision Rule)
Decision rule  is BNE decision rule of (G;S) if there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium  of (G;S) that
induces .
We now have the following straightforward but important observation:
Lemma 2 Every Bayes Nash equilibrium decision rule of (G;S) is a Bayes correlated equilibrium of (G;S).
Proof. Let  be induced by BNE strategy prole . To show obedience, observe thatX
a i;t i;
























1Aui   a0i; a i ;  , by (15)



















which yields the denition of an obedient decision rule.
We will be interested in what can be said about actions and states if signals are not observed. We will
call a mapping
 : ! (A) ;
a random choice rule, and say  is induced by decision rule  if it is the marginal of  on A. Random
choice rule  is a Bayes Nash (correlated) equilibrium random choice rule of (G;S) if it is induced by a
Bayes Nash (correlated) equilibrium decision rule of (G;S).
We want to discuss situations where players observe more information than that contained in a single
information structure. To formalize this, we must discuss combinations of information structures. If we








, we will say that information structure
S = (T ; ) is a combination of experiments S1 and S2 if
T i = T
1





















for each t2 2 T 2 and  2 .
Note that this denition places no restrictions on whether signals t1 2 T 1 and t2 2 T 2 are independent
or correlated, conditional on , under . Thus any pair of information structures S1 and S2 will have
many combined information structures. An experiment S is said to be an expansion of S1 if S is a
combination of S1 and some other experiment S2.
Theorem 2 (Epistemic Relationship)
A decision rule  is a Bayes correlated equilibrium of (G;S) if and only if, for some expansion S of S, it
is a BNE decision rule of (G;S).
Thus this is an incomplete information analogue of the Aumann (1987) characterization of correlated
equilibrium for complete information games. An alternative interpretation of this result - following
Aumann (1987) - would be to say that BCE captures the implications of common certainty of rationality
(and the common prior assumption) in the game G when player have at least information S, since requiring
BNE in some game with expanded information is equivalent to describing a belief closed subset where the
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game G is being played, players have access to (at least) information S and there is common certainty of
rationality.7 The proof follows a very similar logic to the analogous results of Aumann (1987) for complete
information and that of Forges (1993) for the Bayesian solution (discussed in Section 6).
An interesting question that we do not explore is what we can say about the relation between Bayes
correlated equilibria and the expansions that are needed to support them as Bayes Nash equilibria. Milch-
taich (2012) examines properties of devices needed to implement correlated equilibria, and tools developed
in his paper might be useful for this task.
Proof. Suppose that  is a Bayes correlated equilibrium of (G;S). ThusX
a i;t i;

















be an expansion of S, and, in particular,




















  =  ( tj ) (a jt;  ) (17)
for each a 2 A and t 2 T . Now, in the game (G;S), consider the "truthful" strategy j for player j, with
j
 
a0j jtj ; aj

=
8<: 1; if a0j = aj ;0; if a0j 6= aj ; (18)
for all tj 2 Tj and aj 2 Aj . Now the interim payo¤ to player i observing signal (ti; ai) and choosing action
a0i in (G;S















aj jtj ; a0j











7Aumann and Dreze (2008) extend Aumann (1987) by asking what interim payo¤ a player might receive consistent with
common knowledge of rationality (and the common prior assumption) in a complete information game. They consider the
"doubled" game where each action has two identical copies (i.e., leading to the same payo¤s). They show that the set of
all payo¤s that a player might receive in a correlated equilibrium in the doubled game conditional on choosing some action
characterizes the set of interim payo¤s consistent with common knowledge of rationality. An exactly analogous result holds
in our setting: the set of interim payo¤s consistent with common knowledge of rationality and observing a particular signal is
equal to the set of interim payo¤s given that signal and some action in a Bayes correlated equilibrium.
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by (17) and (18), and thus Bayes Nash equilibrium optimality conditions for the truth telling strategy
prole  are implied by the obedience conditions on .
Conversely, suppose that  is a Bayes Nash equilibrium of (G;S), where S is a combined experiment
for S and S0. Write  : T ! (A) for the decision rule induced by , so that










aj jtj ; t0j
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aj jtj ; t0j

















aj jtj ; t0j
1Aui   a0i; a i ;  ,
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1Aui   a0i; a i ;  ;
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and thus BNE equilibrium conditions imply obedience of .
4 Comparing Information Structures
We now report on our many player generalizations of Blackwells theorem.
4.1 Incentive Compatibility Ordering
We write BCE (G;S) for the set of BCE random choice rules of (G;S). Our rst ordering is:
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Denition 15 (Incentive Constrained)
Information structure S is more incentive constrained than information structure S0 if, for all basic games
G,






To make the comparison with Blackwells Theorem, we introduce feasibility orderings on information
structures. One natural generalization of feasibility from the single person case would be to look at random
choice rules that could arise from players choosing actions independently given their signals, i.e., according
to standard incomplete information game strategies. We will focus on an alternative generalization of
feasibility from the single person case that is based on the idea of belief invariance. Recall that a decision
rule is a mapping  : T   ! (A). We will abuse notation and write i : T   ! (Ai) for the
induced mapping looking only at player is action, so that
i (aij (ti; t i) ; ) ,
X
a i2A i
 ((ai; a i) j (ti; t i) ; ) . (19)
Denition 16 (Belief Invariant Decision Rule)
Decision rule  is belief invariant for (G;S) if, for each i, i (aij (ti; t i) ; ) is independent of (t i; ).
Thus the condition requires that, from each player is perspective, his strategy depends only on his
own signal. However, it allows for there to be correlation among the playersactions. Equivalently, the
decision rule is belief invariant if, for each i, the three variables (ai; ti; (t i; )) are a Blackwell triple under
the distribution on Ai  T   induced by any prior  2 ++ (),  and . Thus, via Lemma 1, we
observe that decision rule  is belief invariant if and only if, for any prior on , the probability of (t i; )
conditional on ti and ai is independent of ai. Thus it says that the action a player chooses cannot reveal
more information about the state and others types than that contained in his type. This statement
and motivation of belief invariance has played a central role in the incomplete information correlated
equilibrium literature (see, e.g., Forges (2006)), as we will discuss in the next Section. Notice that while
it is convenient to identify belief invariance with a basic game G and information structure S, the only
connection is that the actions sets of G and signal sets of S are used in dening the space where  lives.
Now we dene feasible random choices to be those that could arise from belief invariant decision rules.
Denition 17 (Feasible Random Choice Rule)
A random choice rule  is feasible for (G;S) if it is induced by a decision rule which is belief invariant for
(G;S).
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We write F (G;S) for the set of feasible random choice rules.
Denition 18 (Permissive Information Structure)
Information structure S is more permissive than information structure S0 if, for all basic games G,





We discuss and show equivalence to the alternative versions of feasibility orderings we discussed in the
single person case, e.g., Blackwells "more informative" ordering and economists"more valuable" ordering
in Appendix 8.1.
4.3 Statistical Ordering
We will use the following many player generalization of su¢ ciency.
Denition 19 (Individual Su¢ ciency)
Information structure S = (T; ) is individually su¢ cient for information structure S0 = (T 0; 0) if there























 et0i; t0 i j (20)
is independent of t i and .
Denition 20 (Mutual Individual Su¢ ciency)
Information structures S and S0 are mutually individually su¢ cient if S is individually su¢ cient for S0
and S0 is individually su¢ cient for S.
Thus S is individually su¢ cient for S0 if there is a combined experiment under which, for each i,
(t0i; ti; (t i; )) is a Blackwell triple. Via Lemma 1, an equivalent way of dening individual su¢ ciency
is that observing t0i gives no additional information about t i and  beyond that contained in ti. In





















e  ti;et i ;  t0i; t0 i je (21)
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is independent of t0i. A third, Markov kernel, way of dening individual su¢ ciency is to say that S is



















j (ti; t i) ; 

(23)
is independent of t i and .
Notice that (23) is a belief invariance property. Thus a random choice rule  is feasible for (G;S) if and
only if information structure S = (T; ) is individually su¢ cient for the information structure S0 = (A; ).
The Markov kernel version of individual su¢ ciency will be useful both in arguments and in allowing
us to relate individual su¢ ciency to earlier concepts in the literature, especially those of Liu (2011) and
Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010), (2011). To motivate individual su¢ ciency, we will rst establish
its relation to alternative orderings and the earlier literature and then report some general properties that
illustrate how it constitutes a natural ordering on information structures. In Section 5, we illustrate
individual su¢ ciency and the properties discussed in this Section using a family of binary signal examples.
Alternative Orderings One can apply the original denition of su¢ ciency in the many player context,
comparing the joint information of all players. Thus - focussing on the Markov kernel formulation - say











for each t0 2 T and  2 . From the denition, it is not clear if this ordering on information structures
is more stringent or less stringent than individual su¢ ciency. Intuitively, it is more stringent because it
requires the Markov kernel  to be independent of , which is not required in the Markov kernel formulation
of individual su¢ ciency; but it is less stringent in that it does not require the belief invariance property
(23). We will later report examples where information structure S is su¢ cient for S0 but not individually
su¢ cient for S0. Conversely, we will report other examples where information structure S is individually
su¢ cient for S0 but not su¢ cient for S0.
Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010), (2011) introduce a number of strengthenings of su¢ ciency for
purposes that we will discuss below in Section 7.3. In particular, they say that S0 is a non-communicating
garbling of S if there exists  : T ! (T 0) satisfying (22) and (23) which is also independent of . In
order to clarify the relation to individual su¢ ciency, we will say in this case that S is a a non-communicating
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ungarbling of S0. Now equivalently, S is a non-communicating ungarbling of S0 if there exists a combined
experiment for S and S0 such that the distribution of t0 conditional on t and  is independent of  and, for
each player i, the distribution of t0i conditional on ti is independent of t i and . Clearly, if S is a non-
communicating ungarbling of S0, then S is su¢ cient for S0 and S is individually su¢ cient for S0. We will
show by example in Section 5 below that the converse is not true: we will describe information structures
S and S0 such that S is su¢ cient for S0, S is individually su¢ cient for S0 but S is not a non-communicating
ungarbling of S0.
Liu (2011) introduced a natural denition of a correlation device in a many player context: if you x an
information structure S and signal sets (T 0i )
I
i=1 that players might observe, Liu (2011) said that a mapping
 : T   ! (T 0) was a correlation device if it satised (23). Thus we can re-state our denition of
individual su¢ ciency in the language of Liu (2011): information structure S is individually su¢ cient for
information structure S0 if there exists a combined experiment S such that the implied Markov kernel
 : T ! (T 0) is a correlating device.
4.4 Individual Su¢ ciency and Higher Order Beliefs
Let us write S  S0 if information structure S is individually su¢ cient for S0. The individual su¢ ciency
ordering is a partial order, with many information structures not comparable, just as su¢ ciency is a partial
ordering with many experiments not comparable. This partial order has some natural properties, and which
are many player generalizations of well-establish properties for su¢ ciency, which we establish next. First,
we note that the ordering is transitive with a well dened maximal and minimal information structure.
Lemma 3 (Some Basic Properties)
1. (Largest and smallest) For all S, S  S  S.
2. (Transitivity) If S  S0 and S0  S00, then S  S00.
An experiment can be identied with the posterior beliefs that it induces. Thus if we x an experiment
S = (T; ) and a full support prior  2 ++ (), and we write  (jt) for the implied posterior beliefs,












To facilitate comparison with the many player case, we will label this property "non-redundancy". For
any information structure S = (T; ), we write
 (t i; jti) ,
P
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for player is implied conditional beliefs under prior  2 ++ (). We next establish a relationship
between individual su¢ ciency and higher order beliefs and redundancy.
Denition 21 (Higher Order Belief Equivalent)
1. Information structure S is non-redundant if, for every i and ti,t0i 2 Ti, there exists t i 2 T i and
 2  such that  (t i; jti) 6=  (t i; jt0i) for some (or all)  2 ++ ().














are higher order belief








exist, for each i = 1; ::; I and k = 1; 2, fki : T
k
i ! T i such that:




fk tk = to  =  (tj) ; (25)




fk i tk i = t io ;  ti =  t i; jfki (ti) . (26)
It is easy (but notationally burdensome) to show that two information structures are higher order
belief equivalent if and only if, for any prior over states, they generate the same probability distribution
over beliefs and higher order beliefs (i.e., Mertens-Zamir types). We present a formal statement of this
equivalence in Lemma 10 in Appendix 8.2.
Lemma 4 (Unique Non-Redundant Information Structure)
1. For every information structure S, there is a unique non-redundant information structure bS such
that S and bS are mutually individually su¢ cient and higher order belief equivalent
2. Any two information structures are mutually individually su¢ cient if and only if they are higher
order belief equivalent.
Liu (2011) proved (in Theorem 1) that if two information structures - one of which is non-redundant
- are higher order belief equivalent if and only if there is a unique correlating device - in the sense he
dened and we report in Section 4.3 - that maps the non-redundant information structure into the perhaps
redundant one. This implies that the non-redundant information structure is individually su¢ cient for
the perhaps redundant one. Since it is easy to show that the redundant information structure is su¢ cient
for the non-redundant one, we have they are mutually individually su¢ cient. This implies part 1 of
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the Lemma. The second part can be proved by adapting arguments in Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya
(2011); for completeness, in Appendix 8.2, we give a proof. Finally, we note that there is a tight connection
between the individual su¢ ciency ordering and the more basic notion of "expansion" as a measure of more
information.
Lemma 5
Information structure S is individually su¢ cient for information structure S0 if and only if S is higher
order belief equivalent to an expansion of S0.
4.5 Three Orderings
Now we have:
Theorem 3 The following statements are equivalent:
1. Information structure S is individually su¢ cient for information structure S0.
2. Information structure S is more incentive constrained than information structure S0.
3. Information structure S is more permissive than information structure S0.
The equivalence between (1) and (3) is straightforward and is included (in the Theorem and proof) to
highlight the connection with Blackwells Theorem.
A straightforward Corollary of the equivalence of (1) and (2) is:
Corollary 1 Information structures S and S0 are mutually individually su¢ cient if and only if each is
more incentive constrained than the other.
As we will discuss below, this could have been proved by adapting either the arguments of Liu (2011)
or those of Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2011). However, neither result or argument helps prove
our main result, which is the equivalence of (1) and (2). The proof that (1) implies (2) is constructive,
showing that if S is individually su¢ cient for S0 and  is a BCE random choice rule of (G;S), we can use
the BCE decision rule inducing  and the Markov kernel establishing individual su¢ ciency to construct a
BCE of (G;S0) which induces . The novel argument is that (2) implies (1). We do this by constructing
a particular basic game G, and a BCE random choice rule  of (G;S0) such that  is a BCE random
choice rule of (G;S) only if S is individually su¢ cient for S0. A heuristic version of this argument is to
consider a game where players have an incentive to truthfully report their beliefs and higher order beliefs,
as in Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007). There is a BCE random choice rule  of (G;S0) where they
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truthfully report their types. We then show that for there to be a BCE of (G;S) which induces  (and
thus has players report the distribution of beliefs and higher order beliefs corresponding to S), S must be
individually su¢ cient for S0. This argument is only heuristic, since we actually want to construct a nite
action basic game. Our formal argument uses a large enough nite approximation to the "higher order
beliefs" game.
Proof. We rst show that (1) implies (2). Suppose that S is individually su¢ cient for S0. Take any
basic game G and any BCE  of (G;S). We will construct 0 : T 0! (A) which is a BCE of (G;S0)
which gives rise to the same stochastic map as .
Write Vi (ai; a0i; ti) for the expected utility for agent i under distribution  if he is type ti, receives

















Now - by Denition 11 - for each i = 1; :::; I, ti 2 Ti and ai 2 Ai, we have







for each a0i 2 Ai. Since S is individually su¢ cient for S0, there exists a mapping  : T   ! (T 0)





















i) for the expected utility for agent i under decision rule 
0 if he is type t0i,





































Now  satises the obedience condition (Denition 11) to be a correlated equilibrium of (G;S0) if for each
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for each a0i 2 Ai. Thus 0 is a BCE of (G;S0). By construction 0 and  induce the random choice rule
 : ! (A). Since this argument started with an arbitrary BCE random choice rule  of (G;S) and an
arbitrary G, we have BCE (G;S)  BCE (G;S0) for all games G.
We now show that (2) implies (1). Suppose that S is more information constrained than S0. We
will show that if, in addition, S is non-redundant, then S is individually su¢ cient for S0. If S was not
non-redundant, we could let bS be the unique non-redundant information structure which is higher order
belief equivalent to S, as shown in Lemma 4. We would show that bS is individually su¢ cient for S0. By
Lemma 4, S is individually su¢ cient for bS and so, by Lemma 3, S is individually su¢ cient for S0.
Write i (ti) 2 (T i ) for type tis beliefs
i (t i; jti) =




Write i for the range of i. Thus i : T i ! i. By non-redundancy of S, there is well dened inverse
map  1i : i ! T i, so that i (ti) = i if and only if 
 1
i (i) = ti.
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ti;et i je   t0i; t0 i j  ti;et i ;e :










for each t0 and . Note that Z is a compact set. Now suppose that S is not individual su¢ cient for S0.














i  jti; t0i  i (jti) ,
where kk represents the Euclidean distance vectors in RT i. The compactness of the set Z and the
continuity of the nite collection of mappings i (jti; t0i) with respect to  imply that " > 0.




i=1 ;  

and an action state distribution  2
(A) such that  2 BCE (G;S) but  =2 BCE (G;S0). This will complete the proof of the
argument that (2) implies (1).
Recall that i (the range of i) is a nite subset of (T i ). Let i be any "-grid of (T i ),
i.e., a nite subset of (T i ) satisfying the property that, for all i 2 (T i ), there exists 0i 2 i
with
i   0i  ". Now let Ai = i [ i. Let














et i;e2 , if aj 2 j , 8j 6= i;
0, otherwise.
Now suppose player i assigns probability 1 to his opponents choosing a i 2  i and, in particular, for







to his opponents choosing a i and the
state being .
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kik2   kai   ik2

:
Thus player i with belief i has a best response to set ai equal to one of the points in Ai  (T i )
with the shortest Euclidean distance to bi.
Now the game (G;S) has - by construction - a "truth-telling" BCE where each type ti always chooses
action i (ti). This give rise to action state distribution  where
 (a; ) =
8<:  () (aj) , if a 2 T;0, if a =2 T:
So  is a BCE action state distribution of (G;S). For  to be BCE of (G;S0), there must exist  2 Z









is a BCE. But for any  2 Z, we showed that there exist i, ti and t0i withi  jti; t0i  i (jti)  2".
But this implies a violation of obedience, since by construction of G, there exists an action ai 2 Ai which
is within " of i (jti; t0i) and thus closer to 

i (jti; t0i) than i (jti), and so a player with type t0i receiving
action recommendation ti would strictly prefer to deviate to ai.
To show (1) implies (3), observe that if  2 F (G;S0), then S0 is individually su¢ cient for (A; ). Now
if S is individually su¢ cient for S0 and S0 is individually su¢ cient for (A; ), then by transitivity (see
Lemma 3), S is individually su¢ cient for (A; ). This is equivalent to saying that  is belief invariant for
(G;S).
To show (3) implies (1), consider a basic game G with action set T 0. If S is not individually su¢ cient
for S0, there does not exist  : T   ! (T 0) satisfying (22) and (23). But this implies that does
not exist a belief invariant decision rule for (G;S) which induces 0. On the other hand, consider the
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"truth-telling" decision rule 0 : T 0 ! (T 0) for (G;S0) with
0
 et0jt0;  =
8<: 1, if et0 = t0;0, otherwise.
This is clearly belief invariant (G;S0) and induces random choice rule 0. So 0 2 F (G;S0) but 0 =2
F (G;S), implying that S is not more permissive that S0.
5 Leading Example: Binary Action Games and Binary Signal Informa-
tion Structures
We will use a family of examples to illustrate our denitions and results. Suppose that there are two
players, i 2 fAnn, Bobg, and two states  = f0; 1g. Consider the basic game where each player has
two actions Ai = fa0; a1g, the prior is uniform on the two states, and each player gets a payo¤ of 1 if both
players set their actions equal to the state, a payo¤ of " if his action is equal to the state but his opponents
is not, and 0 otherwise. Thus the payo¤ matrices are given by
 = 0 a0 a1
a0 1; 1 "; 0
a1 0; " 0; 0
 = 1 a0 a1
a0 0; 0 0; "
a1 "; 0 1; 1
; (30)
where the row corresponds to the action of Ann, the column corresponds to the action of Bob, and the
matrix corresponds to the state. We will focus on the case where " = 0 but also discuss the robustness of
our results if we let " vary from 0.
Consider the information structure Sq;r where each player has two signals, Ti = ft0; t1g, each players





and both playerssignals are equal to the true
state with probability r 2 [2q   1; q]. We will refer to q as the accuracy of the information structure and
to r (somewhat loosely) as the correlation of the signals. Thus the signal structure is described in the
following tables:
 = 0 t0 t1
t0 r q   r
t1 q   r r + 1  2q
 = 1 t0 t1
t0 r + 1  2q q   r
t1 q   r r
; (31)
where the row corresponds to Anns signal, the column corresponds to Bobs signal and the matrix corre-
sponds to the state. This class of information structures includes all binary signal information structures
which are symmetric across players and states.
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We will often focus on the information structure with the minimum correlation consistent with accuracy
q, i.e., the information structure Sq;2q 1 with
 = 0 t0 t1
t0 2q   1 1  q
t1 1  q 0
 = 1 t0 t1
t0 0 1  q
t1 1  q 2q   1
: (32)
Under this information structure, the players never both receive the "wrong" signal. The set of possible
information structures Sq;r are illustrated in Figure 4 in the (q; r) space. The set of possible information
structures are formed by the intersection of three lines, r = q, r = 2q 1 and q = 1=2, where r = q describes
all information structures where the signal of the agents are perfectly correlated, r = 2q  1, describes the
minimal correlation for a given accuracy q, as represented by the information structure Sq;2q 1 above in
(32) and q = 1=2 describes the set of all information structure that contain zero information regarding the
state . The set of information structures with conditionally independent signals of the agents is described
by r = q2 and is in the interior of the set of possible information structures.
Insert Figure 4 here
The set of actions is isomorphic to the set of signals in our examples, so we can represent symmetric
random choice rules using the same notation as for information structures, i.e., there is a random choice
rule with accuracy q and correlation r given by
 = 0 a0 a1
a0 r q   r
a1 q   r r + 1  2q
 = 1 a0 a1
a0 r + 1  2q q   r
a1 q   r r
where the row corresponds to Anns action, the column corresponds to Bobs action and the matrix
corresponds to the state. However, while for information structures we assumed q  12 , we will need to
allow for q < 12 in random choice rules. Thus the set of symmetric random choice rules is formed by the
intersection of three lines, r = q, r = 2q 1 and r = 0, and thus in Figure 4 the triangle in positive orthant
that remains after removing the vertical line q = 1=2.
We will use this two dimensional class of (symmetric) information structures and two dimensional class
of (symmetric) decision rules to illustrate our results. We nd it useful to restrict attention to these
classes because they are easy to visualize and we will extensively use pictures to illustrate what is going on.
Calvo-Argengol (2006) showed that - even in complete information games - characterizing and visualizing
all correlated equilibria of all two player two actions games is not easy. We emphasize that we will be
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using this class of examples to illustrate results that apply to general, asymmetric, information structures
and general, asymmetric, decision rules.
We now illustrate the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in the example. The set of symmetric BCE




= (0; 0) ; (1; 1); (q; 2q   1) and (2 (1  q) ; 1  q). (33)
This set is illustrated in Figure 5, for two information structures with minimal correlation. The larger
triangle is generated by the information structure: q = 2=3; r = 1=3, whereas the smaller trapezoid is
generated the information structure q = 5=6; r = 2=3. We observe that for q = 2=3, the two random choice
rules, (q; 2q   1) and (2 (1  q) ; 1   q), coincide, and hence reducing the set of BCE to a triangle. We
also observe that as the accuracy q of the signals is increasing, the information of each individual agent is
improving and thus the incentive constraints tighten and, in turn, the set of Bayes correlated equilibria is
shrinking.
Insert Figure 5 here
A full analysis of the example is presented in Appendix 8.3. Here we merely sketch why these points
are BCE random choice rules and provide an intuition why they are extremal. First, the random choice
rule (1; 1) is induced by the decision rule where each player always sets his action equal to the state.
This corresponds to the case of complete information, where each player observes the true state and both
players set the action equal to the state. Since this is an equilibrium under complete information, a Nash
equilibrium, it is also a BCE. Similarly, the random choice rule (0; 0) is induced by the decision rule where
the players set their actions equal to each other but di¤erent to the state. This also corresponds to the
case of complete information where each player observes the true state, but where both players follow the
dominated but equilibrium strategies of setting their actions di¤erent from the state. The random choice
rule (q; 2q   1) is induced by the decision rule where each player sets his action equal to his signal. This
corresponds to the Bayes Nash equilibrium of the game where players observe no additional information.
Finally, consider the random choice rule (2 (1  q) ; 1  q). One can show that it is induced by the decision
rule described by the following table:
 = 0 t0a0 t0a1 t1a0 t1a1
t0a0
1 q




t1a0 0 0 0 0
t1a1 1 0 0 1
 = 1 t0a0 t0a1 t1a0 t1a1
t0a0 1 0 0 1
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where the matrix determines the state, the row corresponds to the (signal, action) pair of Ann, the column
corresponds to the (signal, action) pair of Bob, and the entries describe the conditional probability of that
action prole being played given the state and signal prole. Thus, the conditional probabilities in every
2 2 submatrix which is formed by a vector of state  and signals by Ann and Bob have to sum up to one.
We note that the entries in the prole (0; t1; t1) and (1; t0; t0) are without consequence as each one of
these proles is a zero probability event. This decision rule induces the random choice rule (2 (1  q) ; 1 q)
since the probability that any player chooses the action corresponding to the state is
(2q   1) 1  q
2q   1 + (1  q) 1 = 2 (1  q)
and the probability that both players choose the action corresponding equal to the state is
(2q   1) 1  q
2q   1 = 1  q.
The four extremal BCE random choice rules were given by (33) can be used to illustrate Theorem 2, which
established the relationship between the Bayes correlated and Bayes Nash equilibria. Both (0; 0) and (1; 1)
correspond to the Nash equilibria of the complete information game, so the expanded information structure
is one where the state becomes common knowledge. Random choice rule (q; 2q   1) corresponds to the
Bayes Nash equilibrium with no additional private information beyond the uniform prior over the states.
An expansion that generates the BCE random choice (2 (1  q) ; 1   q) is one where, conditional on both
players observing the same, correct, signal of the state, with probability 3q 22q 1 there is a public announcement
that they have both observed correct signals. Conditional on receiving this public signal, the dominated
Nash equilibrium of the complete information game is played. If the public signal is not observed, then
Ann is sure that Bob is setting his action equal to the state, and she thinks it equally likely that her
signal is correct or incorrect. She is thus indi¤erent between the two actions. Thus (2 (1  q) ; 1  q) is a
BCE where the obedience constraints hold as an equality for both actions. By contrast, in the other three
extremal BCE of (33), the obedience constraints are not binding.
We calculated the BCE for a non-generic game (with " = 0) where there are weakly dominated strategies
in the underlying complete information game. However, small changes in " lead to only small changes in
the sets of BCE. In particular, if " > 0, setting the action equal to the state is a strictly dominant strategy
in the complete information game, and (0; 0) is no longer be a BCE random choice rule. But there is an
extremal BCE random choice rule that is of order " distant from (0; 0). If " < 0, both setting their actions
equal to each other but di¤erent to the state is a strict Nash equilibrium of the complete information game,
and (0; 0) is (just) in the interior of the set of BCE random choice rules.
Next, we illustrate the various statistical orderings that we introduced in Section 4.3 and their rela-
tionship to higher order beliefs.
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Example 1: Individual Su¢ ciency and Redundant Types Consider the following binary informa-
tion structure with signal distribution:















Types here are "redundant" in the sense of Mertens and Zamir (1985): there is common certainty that each
players belief over the states is equal to the prior over the states, and thus types t0 and t1 induce exactly the
same beliefs and higher-order beliefs. Examples such as this have been leading examples in the literature,
see Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007), Ely and Peski (2006), Liu (2011), Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya
(2011), Forges (2006). Now, importantly in our context, this information structure is mutually individually
su¢ cient with the null information structure. It thus illustrates the fact that individual su¢ ciency does
not depend on redundant types, as established generally in Lemma 4.
Example 2: Individual Su¢ ciency and Higher Order Beliefs The previous example had "redun-
dant" types with the same beliefs and higher order beliefs. The next example reports two information
structures, neither of which is individually su¢ cient for the other, even though from each players point









, described by (35):



































Neither is individually su¢ cient for the other. Intuitively, each player is better informed about the others
information under the latter information structure, but the join of the individual signals gives rise to more
extreme posteriors under the rst information structure. It thus illustrates that individually su¢ ciency
accounts both for individual information as well as joint information across the agents.
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, described by (36):































. This illustrates that individual
su¢ ciency may be more demanding than su¢ ciency.
Symmetric Binary Information Structures The previous two examples were comparisons of sym-
metric binary information structures. We can give a complete ordering of such information structures that
veries these examples:
Lemma 6 (Symmetric Binary Information Structures)

















; (q; r) ; (q; q)

: (37)









































Thus, in the space of symmetric binary information structures, individual su¢ ciency and non-communicating
ungarbling induce the same ordering over the information structures, and in turn su¢ ciency generates a
more complete ordering. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for Sq;r to be su¢ cient for Sq0;r0 is that the
accuracy of S is greater than the accuracy of S0, i.e. q  q0. By contrast, for individual su¢ ciency, greater
accuracy is only a necessary condition, but the su¢ ciency part of the condition requires in addition greater
correlation, i.e. r  r0. The amount by which the correlation of S0 can di¤er from the correlation of S
depends on the di¤erence in accuracy between the two information structures. The closer their accuracy,
the closer the correlation of the less accurate experiment must be in order for it to be lower in the partial
order. The sets of information structures that can be ranked relative to a given information structure S
are illustrated in Figure 6 within the (q; r) space for (q; r) = (4=6; 3=6).
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Insert Figure 6 here.
We conclude with two other examples to illustrate the relations between orderings. These examples
still rely only on binary information structures, but are symmetric only across players, but not across
the states. In particular, the examples illustrate that neither of the two orders, su¢ ciency or individual
su¢ ciency, is either weaker or stronger than the other.




, described earlier by
(34), is individually su¢ cient for the following binary information structure, but not su¢ cient for it:





















Example 5: Individual Su¢ ciency and Su¢ ciency vs. Non-Communicating Ungarbling The
nal example in this subsection illustrates the relationship between non-communicating ungarbling and (in-
dividual) su¢ ciency. It followed directly from the denition that if S is a non-communicating ungarbling of
S0, then S is su¢ cient, and also individually su¢ cient, for S0. However, S can be su¢ cient and individually





and individually su¢ cient for the following binary information structure, but not a non-communicating
ungarbling of it:





















These nal two examples are illustrated in Figure 7, where we constrain the binary information structure
to be symmetric with respect to the agents, but allow them to be asymmetric with respect to the state.
Here, we x the accuracy of S and S0, namely q = 2=3 > q0 = 5=9, but allow the correlation represented by
r0 to di¤er across states, and hence illustrate the set of information structures in the space of r0 = (r00; r
0
1),







. Thus the information structure S0 is































The correlation r is restricted to satisfy 2q   1  r  q by the nonnegativity requirement of the




is su¢ cient, individually
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su¢ cient, respectively a non-communicating ungarbling. We nd that the intersection of information
structures S0 for which S is both su¢ cient and individually su¢ cient is strictly larger than the set of non-






, described by (40), is depicted
in southeast corner of the square set of information structures for which S is individually su¢ cient; and






, described by (41), is depicted in the southeast corner of the hexagon of





















, may at rst appear surprising. But it illustrates, the decentralized
assessment of information inherent in individual su¢ ciency. With the decentralized view, the accuracy
q alone determines how informed each individual agent is about the state  (and all the information is
contained in two signals.) However, with su¢ ciency, the joint signal 01 (and symmetrically 10) can also
provide information regarding the state . And in particular, if r00 is very di¤erent from r
0
1, then the joint
signal will provide information regarding , whereas each marginal signal 0 or 1, contains no additional
information.
Insert Figure 7 here.
6 Incomplete Information Correlated Equilibrium
Aumann (1974), (1987) introduced a denition of correlated equilibrium for complete information games.
A classic paper of Forges (1993) is titled "ve legitimate denitions of correlated equilibrium in games
with incomplete information." Her title and paper make the point - which we agree with - that there are
many natural ways of extending the complete information denition to incomplete information settings
and which denition makes sense depends on the purpose for which it is to be used. In this section, we
present a way of seeing how our denition of "Bayes correlated equilibrium" relates to other denitions of
incomplete information correlated equilibrium, highlighting which denition is relevant for which purpose.
For a xed basic game G and information structure S, a Bayes correlated equilibrium is a decision
rule mapping signal proles and payo¤ states to probability distributions over action proles that satises
obedience (14), requiring that a player who knows his signal and the action he is supposed to play has
no incentive to deviate. We treat payo¤ states symmetrically with actions and impose no additional
restrictions on what is feasible. The role of the information structure, then, is only to impose extra
incentive constraints on behavior. Our motive to study this solution concept is Theorem 2: the solution
concept captures rational behavior given that players have access to the signals in the information structure,
but may have additional information.
If a decision rule is belief invariant for (G;S), players have no less but also no more information than
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under information structure S. If we impose belief invariance as well as obedience on a decision rule, we
get a solution concept that was introduced in Liu (2011).
Denition 22 (Belief Invariant BCE)
A decision rule  is a belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium (BIBCE) of (G;S) if it is obedient and
belief invariant for (G;S).
It captures the implications of common knowledge of rationality and that players know exactly the
information contained in S, if the common prior assumption is maintained. As explained in Liu (2011), this
solution concept can be seen as the common prior analogue of the solution concept of interim correlated
equilibrium discussed by Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007). One can show that the set of Bayes
correlated equilibria of (G;S) will consist of all belief invariant BCE of (G;S0) for all information structures
S0 for which S is individually su¢ cient.
Liu (2011) showed that if two information structures are higher order belief equivalent, then they
have the same set of belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibria. His result implies that two information
structures that are higher order belief equivalent have the same set of belief invariant Bayes correlated
equilibria. This in turn implies that they have the same set of Bayes correlated equilibria, which was
Corollary 1 of Theorem 3.
A random choice rule  is a BIBCE random choice rule if it is induced by a BIBCE decision rule.
Observe that a BIBCE random choice rule must therefore be a BCE random choice rule and a feasible
random choice rule, but not every random choice rule that is a BCE and feasible is a BIBCE random
choice rule. To wit, both the Bayes correlated equilibrium and the belief invariant BCE are dened in
terms of a decision rule  rather than a random choice rule . Thus, while the intersection of feasible and
obedient decision rules  equals the set of belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibria, the intersection of
feasible and BCE random choice rules  is a superset, and as evidenced here, sometimes a strict superset,
of the belief invariant BCE random choice rules. This is illustrated in Figure 8 where we display the BCE,
feasible and BIBCE random choice rules in our leading example with the binary information structure Sq;r
with q = 5=6 and r = 2=3.
Insert Figure 8 here.
Much of the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium started from the premise
that an incomplete information denition of correlated equilibrium should capture what could happen if
players had access to a correlation device / mediator under the maintained assumption that the correlation
device/mediator did not have access to information that was not available to the players. We can describe
the assumption formally as:
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Denition 23 (Join Feasible)
Decision rule  is join feasible for (G;S) if  (ajt; ) is independent of .
This gives another solution concept:
Denition 24 (Bayesian Solution)
Decision rule  is a Bayesian solution of (G;S) if it is obedient and join feasible.
This assumption was made implicitly in Forges (1993) and other works, because it was assumed that
type or signal proles exhausted all uncertainty. On the other hand, Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya
(2010), (2011) explicitly impose this assumption. The Bayesian solution was named by Forges (1993) and
it is the weakest version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium she studies. It also corresponds
to the set of jointly coherent outcomes in Nau (1992), justied from "no arbitrage" conditions. Forges and
Koessler (2005) provide a justication if players are able to certify their types to the mediator.
In Figure 9, we display the set of Bayesian solutions and compare them to the BCE and BIBCE
random choice rules. In the present binary and symmetric game, it happens that BIBCE  Bayesian
solution  BCE. More generally, the following inclusions hold for all nite games: BIBCE  BCE and
Bayesian solution  BCE, but there can be BIBCE which do not form a Bayesian solution. Another
special feature of the present binary example is that the Nash equilibria and the Bayes Nash equilibrium
under the common prior are either vertices or located on the edges of the BCE set, more generally both
Nash and Bayes Nash equilibria can (all) be located in the interior of the BCE set.
Insert Figure 9 here.
Imposing both join feasibility and belief invariance, we get a solution concept that has played an
important role in the literature.
Denition 25 (Belief Invariant Bayesian Solution)
Decision rule  is a belief invariant Bayesian solution of (G;S) if it is obedient, belief invariant and join
feasible.
Forges (2006) introduced this name. We will focus our analysis on these four solution concepts. For
any xed game, the denitions imply some relations between the solution concepts illustrated in Figure 10:
the set of belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibria is a subset of the set of Bayes correlated equilibria;
the set of Bayesian solutions is a subset of the set of Bayes correlated equilibria; the set of belief invariant
Bayesian solutions is equal to the intersection of the set of Bayesian solutions and the belief invariant Bayes
correlated equilibria.
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Insert Figure 10 here.
Another way of understanding the solution concepts discussed in this section is to return to the single
player environment that we discussed in Section 2. In single player games, belief invariant BCE, Bayesian
solutions and belief invariant Bayesian solutions all coincide with what we called the Bayes Nash equilib-
rium, i.e., standard optimal behavior for the decision problem. It is only the notion of Bayes correlated
equilibrium, by imposing neither join feasibility nor belief invariance that allows more information to be
reected in the single players choice, and thus leads to the larger set of random choice rules.
Forges (1993), (2006) also surveys three stronger solutions concepts for (G;S). We briey discuss these
informally, and for completeness give formal denitions in our language in Appendix 8.4.
1. One could simply look at the agent normal form of (G;S) and consider the correlated equilibria of this
complete information game. This is equivalent to requiring that the decision rule could be generated
by having a mediator randomize over pure strategies in the incomplete information game, mapping
signals to actions, before observing the state or players signals, and recommendations follow the
chosen pure strategies. Forges (1993) calls this "agent normal form correlated equilibrium."
2. If the mediator can make recommendations only based on reports from the players, players must have
an incentive to tell the truth. A decision rule is "truth-telling" if players both have an incentive to
truthfully report their types and have an incentive to follow their recommendations. This gives the
well known solution concept of "communication equilibrium."
3. One could also look at the (non-agent) strategic form of (G;S) and consider the correlated equilibria
of this complete information game. This imposes additional incentive constraints, since players now
know what the mediator would have recommended if they had been di¤erent types. Forges (1993)
calls this "strategic form correlated equilibrium."
The relationships between these solution concepts are described in Figure 11 below.
Insert Figure 11 here.
Examples in Forges (1993), (2006) show that the relationships in the Venn diagram are tight.
7 Discussion
7.1 Distributed Certainty
It was important in much of our analysis that we did not assume agents collectively knew all possible payo¤
relevant information. If they did, "join feasibility" would be automatically satised. Formally:
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Denition 26 (Distributed Certainty)
Information structure S satises distributed certainty if there exists g : T !  such that  (tj) > 0)  =
g (t).
An important setting where this condition will always be satised is private value environments. This
would be modelled in our language by setting  = 1     I , each Ti = i and let
 (tj) =
8<: 1; if t = ;0; if t 6= :
As an example, in Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2012) we study rst price auctions where bidders know
their own values of a single object. This is a private value environment and thus has distributed certainty.
In our earlier work on robust mechanism design, Bergemann and Morris (2012), we did not assume
private values but did assume "distributed certainty" in much of the work; the epistemic foundations we
reviewed in Bergemann and Morris (2007) were also based on that assumption. Under distributed certainty,
join feasibility is satised by any decision rule and we have:
Lemma 7 If S satises distributed certainty then any decision rule  is join feasible and thus, for any
basic game G, any (belief invariant) Bayes correlated equilibrium of (G;S) is a (belief invariant) Bayesian
solution of (G;S).
7.2 Adding Dummy Players
One way to understand our results is to think about basic games and information structures where we add
a "dummy player" who knows the state but is otherwise irrelevant.8 While this is not how we prefer to
present our results, it does allow us to make connections with the prior literature and understand formal
connections in arguments.
Formally, x a basic game G = ((Ai; ui)Ii=1;  ). Consider a modied basic game with added dummy
player 0, eG = (( eAi; eui)Ii=0;  ) with eA0 = fa0g, eAi = Ai for i = 1; :::; I and eui((a0; (aj)Ij=1); ) =
ui((aj)
I
j=1; ) for i = 1; :::; I, and the form of eu0 does not matter since the dummy player 0 has a sin-
gleton action set. Fix an information structure S = ((Ti)
I
i=1 ; ). Consider a modied information
structure with dummy player, eS = (( eTi)Ii=0; e), with eT0 = , eTi = Ti for i = 1; :::; I and







; if t0 = ;
0; if t0 6= :
8We are grateful to Atsushi Kajii for suggesting that we pursue this dummy player interpretation of Bayes correlated
equilibrium. The taxonomy of incomplete information correlated equilibrium concepts in Milchtaich (2012) discusses the
possibility of treating nature as a player.
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Finally, given decision rule  : T ! (A) for (G;S), call e : eT ! ( eA) the corresponding decision
rule for ( eG; eS) if e a0; (ai)Ii=1 t0; (ti)Ii=1 ;  =  (ai)Ii=1 (ti)Ii=1 ;  ;
and note that the value of e( (t0; (ti)Ii=1);  ) when t0 6=  is not going to be relevant. Now we have:
Lemma 8 Decision rule  : T ! (A) is a (belief invariant) Bayes correlated equilibrium of (G;S)
if and only if the corresponding e : eT   ! ( eA) is a (belief invariant) Bayesian solution of the game
( eG; eS) with added dummy player.
7.3 Finer Orderings on Information Structures
As we discussed in Section 4.3, Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010), (2011) introduced an ordering on
information structures - non-communicating ungarbling - which - as we showed in examples in Section 5 -
is stronger than either individual su¢ ciency and su¢ ciency, and in fact is strictly stronger than requiring
both su¢ ciency and individual su¢ ciency simultaneously.
We will rst describe the results from Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010), (2011) that are closest
to ours, and identify the exact connections. Then we will report further results that they generate.
Let us focus on their results for the solution concept of belief invariant Bayesian solution, which is the
weakest that they focus on. Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010) focusses on common interest games
where players have identical utility functions and on the belief invariant Bayesian solution of (G;S) which
gives players the highest common utility. Theorem 4.5 of Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010) shows
that the maximum utility is higher in (G;S) than in (G;S0) for all common interest games if and only if S
is a non-communicating ungarbling of S0. We noted in the previous subsection that belief invariant Bayes
correlated equilibria are essentially belief invariant Bayesian solutions in the game where a dummy player is
added. It is also easy to show that S is individually su¢ cient for S0 if and only if eS is a non-communicating
ungarbling of eS0, where eS and eS0 are the information structures we get if we add a dummy player to S and
S0 respectively. Thus it is an easy corollary of Theorem 4.5 of Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010) that
if we focus on the belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium of common interest games which maximizes
playersutility, utility is higher in (G;S) than in (G;S0) for all common interest games if and only if S
is individually su¢ cient for S0. Thus the equivalence of feasibility and statistical orderings follows from
arguments in Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010).
Suppose that we write BIBS(G;S) for the set of belief invariant Bayesian solutions of (G;S). Part
(c) of Theorem 2.8 of Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2011) shows that BIBS(G;S) = BIBS(G;S0) for
all basic games G if and only if S and S0 are non-communicating garblings of each other. Corollary 1 of
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Theorem 3 could have been proved by applying the arguments of Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2011)
to basic games and information structures with added dummy players as in the previous sub-section.
However, Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2011) do not have an analogue to our result that if S is
individually su¢ cient for S0, then BCE(G;S)  BCE(G;S0) for all basic games G, and we need a new
argument to prove it. The analogous claim would be that if S is a non-communicating ungarbling of S0,
then BIBS(G;S)  BIBS(G;S0) for all basic games G. However, this claim is almost certainly false
(even though we havent constructed an explicit example). The reason is that the BCE solution concept
imposes only incentive constraints and no feasibility conditions, so information can only reduce the set of
equilibria. However, the BIBS solution concept imposes join feasibility and belief invariance, conditions
that become less demanding the more information there is. Thus the classical conict between incentive
and feasibility requirements becomes relevant.
Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010) and (2011) also propose even stronger orderings on information
structures (independent garbling, coordinated garblings) and show that their results on common interest
games in Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010) and general games in Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya
(2011) extend in a natural way to ner solutions concepts (Bayes Nash equilibrium, agent normal form
correlated equilibrium, respectively)
7.4 The Value of Information in Games Re-Visited
While Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010), (2011) are the closest works to ours, there is a large literature
on the value of information in games, and we now discuss that work and its relation. Hirshleifer (1971)
noted why information might be damaging in a many player context because it removed options to insure
ex ante. Our result on the incentive constrained ordering can be seen as a formalization of the idea behind
the observation of Hirshleifer (1971): we give a general statement of how information creates more incentive
constraints and thus reduces the set of incentive compatible outcomes.
We have highlighted the dual roles of information which are common to the one player and many player
cases: increasing feasible outcomes and reducing incentive compatible ones. Neyman (1991) emphasized
that within a xed overall information structure, under Bayes Nash equilibrium, a player was better o¤
with more information. Thus if some of player is signals are more informative than others, then player
i is better o¤ in equilibrium conditional on receiving the more informative signals. In this case, more
information makes more outcomes feasible and, because other players do not know if he is more informed
or not, does not increase incentive constraints.
Gossner and Mertens (2001) consider Bayes Nash equilibrium and zero sum games and show that a
su¢ cient condition for a player to have a higher value is that he has more information or his opponent has
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less information. They also showed that two information structures imply the same value in all games if
and only if they are higher order belief equivalent. Peski (2008) shows that the su¢ cient conditions are
also necessary. That is, for a xed information structure, the set of information structures where a player
will have a higher value in all zero sum games consists of those where he is more informed and his opponent
is less informed. The proof of this result involves an appeal to the separating hyperplane theorem to show
that if the condition on information structures is not satised, it is possible to construct the zero sum basic
game where the player has a lower value. In our main result, we must similarly construct a basic game
showing a failure of the incentive constrained ordering if the statistical relation fails. The arguments are
quite di¤erent, however.
Gossner (2000) considers Bayes Nash equilibrium and general games and characterizes when one in-
formation structure supports more BNE outcomes than another. While the bulk of his work focusses on
complete information games, in Section 6 and Theorem 19 he considers incomplete information games. His
denition that one information structure S0 is a faithful interpretation of another S translates in our lan-
guage to the requirement that they are higher order belief equivalent and there is a prole of Markov kernels
which are independently mapping each player signals Si into signals in S0i. He shows that S supports more
BNE outcomes than S0 in all games if and only if S0 is a faithful interpretation of S. Thus this ordering
ranks an information structure higher if it gives more "correlation possibilities", but holds xed beliefs
and higher order beliefs. By contrast, individual su¢ ciency abstracts from "correlation possibilities" and
depends non-trivially on beliefs and higher order beliefs about payo¤s.
7.5 An Upper Bound on Information
We have proposed Bayes correlated equilibrium as a solution concept that captures what can happen in
Bayes Nash equilibrium in an incomplete information game (G;S) if players have access to information
structure S but may also observe additional signals. We can also ask the dual question: suppose players
have access to at most the information structure in S but perhaps less. One can o¤er partial answers to
this question using the framework and results of this paper.
Lemma 9 If random choice rule  is induced by a decision rule  which is a Bayes Nash equilibrium





Now suppose we x two information structures S and S such that S is individually su¢ cient for S
(S  S) Suppose that we knew that random choice rule  was induced by a Bayes Nash equilibrium of
(G;S) for some information structure S with S  S  S. We know (by Theorem 2) that  is a BCE
random choice rule for (G;S); and we know from Lemma 9 that  is a feasible random choice rule for
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G;S

. Unfortunately, though, the converse is not true, i.e., it is not true that if  is a BCE random




, then  is induced by a Bayes Nash
equilibrium of (G;S) for some information structure S with S  S  S. To see why, observe that for this
converse to be true, it would have to be true in the special case where S = S = S. In this case, we would
be requiring that if  is a BCE and feasible random choice rule for (G;S), then  is induced by a Bayes
Nash equilibrium of (G;S) for some information structure S which is higher order belief equivalent to S,
which in turn implies that  is a belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium of (G;S). But we already
saw, in Figure 8, there exist random choice rules  which are BCE and feasible random choice rules but
not belief invariant BCE random choice rules. In other words, there may be an obedient decision rule
that induces  and a belief invariant decision rule that induces , but there is no decision rule which is
simultaneously obedient and belief invariant which induces .
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8 Appendix
8.1 Feasibility Orderings
We report a many player generalization of the three feasibility orderings described in Section 2.4 for the
one player case. In Section 4, we dened the set of feasible random choice rules F (G;S) for (G;S). For
purposes of this section, all that matters is that F (G;S) is a compact subset of the set of random choice
rules for (G;S).
Say that G is a common interest basic game if there exists a payo¤ function u such that ui = u for all
i. This focus on common interest games here follows the work of Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010)
for di¤erent solution concepts discussed in Section 7.3. Now we can consider three feasibility orderings for
the many player case that reduce to those discussed for the one player case in Section 2.4.
Denition 27 (More Permissive)
Information structure S is more permissive than information structure S0 if, for all basic games G,





If G is a common interest basic game, write, as before, W (G;S) for the set of state-dependent vectors











Denition 28 (More Informative )







If G is a common interest basic game, write w (G;S) for the highest ex ante utility that (all) players
can attain with a belief invariant decision rule (and thus a feasible random choice rule),








 ()  (aj)u (a; ) .
Note that while we did not impose obedience in the denition of w (G;S), observe that it would not
have made any di¤erence if we did. Thus we also have:




 ()  (aj)u (a; ) .
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Denition 29 (More Valuable)
Information structure S is more valuable than information structure S0 if, for all common interest basic
games G,





Now we have a many player generalization of Proposition 2:
Proposition 3 The following statements are equivalent
1. Information structure S is more permissive than information structure S0
2. Information structure S is more informative than information structure S0
3. Information structure S is more valuable than information structure S0
Proof. (1)) (2)) (3) follows immediately from denitions.




i=1 ;  

and  2 F (G;S0) such
that  2 F (G;S). Since F (G;S) is compact and convex, by the separating hyperplane theorem, there
exists x : A! R such thatX
a2A;2
 ()  (aj)x (a; ) >
X
a2A;2
 ()  (aj)x (a; )






i=1 ;  

be the common interest game with ui = x














 ()  (aj)x (a; )
= w (G; S)
Thus (3) does not hold. Also  X
a2A













so (2) does not hold.
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Note that this proof of the equivalence of the three feasibility orderings does not use any properties of
the sets F (G;S) except that they are convex and compact. A separating argument like this lies at the
heart of proofs of Blackwells theorem, see, e.g., the elementary proof of Leshno and Spector (1992) for
classic Blackwells theorem and that of Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010) for common interest games
and di¤erent solution concepts.
8.2 Understanding Individual Su¢ ciency




is the complete information structure





,  (tj) . (42)
























 ((ti; t i) j) :
Now we show S  S where S = (T ; ) is the null information structure and S = (T; ) is an arbitrary
information structure. Dene Markov kernel  : T   ! (T ) by  (tjt; ) = 1 and the conditions for
individual su¢ ciency are automatically satised.
























j (ti; t i) ; 
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is independent of t0 i and . Dene 




































































which is independent of t i and .
We now present a formal argument that the notion of higher order belief equivalence presented earlier
in Denition 21 is equivalent to a denition in terms of the hierarchical belief types of Mertens and Zamir
(1985).














called a hierarchy (of beliefs). For notational simplicity, we will work with a uniform prior on  (other full
support priors will lead to shifts in posteriors over  but no changes in higher order belief equivalence).






. For each i and ti 2 Ti, write b1i [ti] 2 () =   X0 for
his posterior under a uniform prior on , so
b1i [ti] () =
X
t i2T i






Write b2i [ti] 2  ( ())I 1 =   X1 for his belief over  and the rst order beliefs of other
players, so
b2i [ti]  ; 1 i =
X
ft i2T ijb1j (tj)=1j for each j 6=ig
 ((ti; t i) j)
X





Proceeding inductively for k  2, write bki (ti) 2   Xk 1 for his belief over  and the (k   1)th order
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beliefs of other players, so
bki [ti]; k 1 i  =
X
ft i2T ijbk 1j (tj)=k 1j for each j 6=ig
 ((ti; t i) j)
X





Now we can dene bi : Ti ! H by bi [ti] =  b1i [ti] ; b2i [ti] ; ::::
and b : T ! HI by b [t] = (bi [ti])Ii=1 .

















Lemma 10 (Higher Order Belief Characterization)
The following statements are equivalent:
1. Information structures S1 and S2 are higher order belief equivalent;
2. S1 = S2.
Proof. We argue that (1) implies (2) by induction. By (26),






) bk;1i [ti] = bk;1i t0i .
Now suppose that






) bk;li [ti] = bk;li t0i .
By (26), we have






) bk;l+1i [ti] = bk;l+1i t0i .
But since the premise of the inductive step holds for l = 1, we have that for all l






) bk;li [ti] = bk;li t0i .
and thus






) bki [ti] = bki t0i .
Now suppose that (2) holds. Let T i =range
 b1i  =range b2i . Let fki (ti) = bki (ti). By construction,
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are higher order belief equivalent, we can show that S1 is



















One can similarly show that S2 is individually su¢ cient for S1.
Now suppose that S1 and S2 are mutually individually su¢ cient. If either S1 or S2 are redundant, we
can replace them with their (by part (1)) unique non-redundant versions, and they will remain mutually
individually su¢ cient. So it is enough to show that if S1 and S2 are mutually individually su¢ cient and
non-redundant, then they are higher order belief equivalent. Write 1 and 2 for the Markov kernels
establishing that, respectively, S1 is individually su¢ cient for S2 and S2 is individually su¢ cient for S1.
Dene b : T 1 !   T 1 by





t1;  2  et1 t2;  





 etj b  t et;  and
bi  et1i t1i  = Xet1 i2T i

































ti;bt i j = Xet2T 
 etj Xbt i2P i(t i) b
  







  eti;et i  Xbt i2P i(t i) b
  







  eti;et i  Xbt i2T i b
  











bi  ti eti  Xet i2P i(t i)
  eti;et i  :























bi  ti eti i  eti Xet i2P i(t i) 
 et i; jti :
This condition states that posteriors over (P i (t i) ; ) for ti are a weighted sum of posteriors foreti 2 Pi (ti). This implies that all have the same beliefs. If the information structure is non-redundant,
this implies that each bi must be the identity function. But this implies that 1 and 2 are identities and
thus S1 and S2 are higher order belief equivalent.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose that S is individually su¢ cient for S0. Thus there exists  : T !



















j (ti; t i) ; 

(44)
is independent of t i and . Let S = (T ; ) be the combined information structure with T i = Ti  T 0i
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for each t; t0 and .
We will rst show that S is individually su¢ cient for S. To do so, dene  : T ! (T ) by
 (tjt; ) = 
  et; t0 jt;  =
8<:  (t0jt; ) , if et = t;0, if et 6= t, (46)
for each t =
 et; t0 2 T , t and . Observe thatX
t
 (tj)
  et; t0 jt;  =   etj  t0jet;  , by (46)
= 
 et; t0j , by (45).

























j (ti; t i) ; 

, if et = t;
0, if et 6= t,
is independent of t i and  by (44).
We will now show that S is individually su¢ cient for S. To do so, dene b : T  ! (T ) by
b (tjt; ) = b  tj  et; t0 ;  =
8<: 1, if et = t;0, if et 6= t, (47)
for each t =
 et; t0 2 T , t and . Observe thatX
t82T 
 (tj) b (tjt; ) = X
(et;t0)2T 



















for each t and . Also observe thatX
t i
b  (ti; t i) j  ti ; t i ;  = X
t i
b  (ti; t i) j   eti; t0i ;  et i; t0 i ; 
=
8<: 1, if eti = ti;0, if eti 6= ti,
Bayes Correlated Equilibrium February 4, 2013 59
is independent of t i and .
We have now shown that if S is individually su¢ cient for S0 then there exists an expansion of S0, S,
such that S and S are mutually individually su¢ cient. By Lemma 4, S and S are higher order belief
equivalent.
Conversely, suppose that S is higher order belief equivalent to an expansion of S0. Let us call that
expansion S =
 





. By Lemma 4, S is individually su¢ cient for S. Thus there exists
 : T ! (T ) such that X
t
 (tj) (tjt; ) =  (tj) (48)








j (ti; t i) ; 

(49)















































, because S is an expansion of S0








































; t ij (ti; t i) ; 

which is independent of t i and  by (49).
8.3 Leading Example: Binary Action, Binary Information Structure
8.3.1 Bayes Correlated Equilibria in the Leading Example
We rst establish the claim that the set of symmetric BCE random choice rules of (G"; Sq;2q 1) if " = 0
and q  23 is the convex hull of the set of four random choice rules given earlier by (33): 
q0; r0

= (0; 0) ; (1; 1); (q; 2q   1) and (2 (1  q) ; 1  q).
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Now, symmetric random choice rules which are parameterized by (q0; r0) must have
max

0; 2q0   1
	
 r0  q0: (51)
Consider the following convenient parameterization of the distribution on A2  T 2 conditional on ,
generated by the information structure Sq;2q 1 and a symmetric decision rule:
 = 0 00 01 10 11
00 x1 x2 x3 x4
01 x2 x5 x6 x7
10 x3 x6 0 0
11 x4 x7 0 0
 = 1 00 01 10 11
00 0 0 x7 x4
01 0 0 x6 x3
10 x7 x6 x5 x2
11 x4 x3 x2 x1
: (52)
Here, rows correspond to the signal action pair (t; a) of Ann, the columns correspond to the signal action
pair (t; a) of Bob and the matrix corresponds to the state. For this decision rule to induce the random
choice rules parameterized by (q0; r0), we must have:
x1 + 2x3 = r
0; (53)
x2 + x4 + x6 = q
0   r0: (54)
For the decision rule to be consistent with information structure Sq;2q 1, we must have:
x1 + 2x2 + x5 = 2q   1; (55)
x3 + x4 + x6 + x7 = 1  q: (56)
The obedience constraint that a player follows his action recommendation when equal to his signal implies
that
x1 + x3  x4: (57)
The obedience constraint that a player follows his action recommendation when not equal to his signal
implies that
x2 + x6  x3: (58)
Adding (57) and (58) gives
x1 + 2x3  x2 + x4 + x6 (59)
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Now
q0   r0 = x2 + x4 + x6, by (54) (60)
 x3 + x4, by (57)
 x3 + x4 + x6 + x7
= 1  q, by (56)




= (0; 0) ; (1; 1); (q; 2q   1) and (2 (1  q) ; 1  q).
We have shown that the set of BCE random choice rules is a subset of this convex hull. To show it is
equal to this convex hull, it is enough to show that it is possible to nd decision rules described according
to (52) satisfying (53) - (58) corresponding to each of these four points. These are, for (0; 0):
 = 0 00 01 10 11
00 0 0 0 0
01 0 2q   1 0 1  q
10 0 0 0 0
11 0 1  q 0 0
 = 1 00 01 10 11
00 0 0 1  q 0
01 0 0 0 0
10 1  q 0 2q   1 0
11 0 0 0 0
;
for (1; 1):
 = 0 00 01 10 11
00 2q   1 0 1  q 0
01 0 0 0 0
10 1  q 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0
 = 1 00 01 10 11
00 0 0 0 0
01 0 0 0 1  q
10 0 0 0 0
11 0 1  q 0 2q   1
;
for (q; 2q   1):
 = 0 00 01 10 11
00 2q   1 0 0 1  q
01 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
11 1  q 0 0 0
 = 1 00 01 10 11
00 0 0 0 1  q
01 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
11 1  q 0 0 2q   1
;
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and for (2 (1  q) ; 1  q):
 = 0 00 01 10 11
00 1  q 0 0 1  q
01 0 3q   2 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
11 1  q 0 0 0
 = 1 00 01 10 11
00 0 0 0 1  q
01 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 3q   2 0
11 1  q 0 0 1  q
:
8.3.2 Binary Information Structures and Orderings

















+ 3 (q; r) + 4 (q; q) :







































 (t j ) ;
and so r0 = 0 (00 j0) with:








2 + 3r + 4q;
and similarly:




1 + 3 (q   r) ;
as well as








2 + 4 (1  q) ;
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and so it follows:





2 + 3q + 4q;
r0 = 0 (00 j0) = 1
2
2 + 3r + 4q:
More generally, we have
0 (j0) t02 = 0 t02 = 1
t01 = 0
1
22 + 3r + 4q
1
21 + 3 (q   r)
t1 = 1
1
21 + 3 (q   r)
1
22 + 4 (1  q)
0 (j1) t02 = 0 t02 = 1
t01 = 0
1
22 + 4 (1  q)
1
21 + 3 (q   r)
t01 = 1
1
21 + 3 (q   r)
1
22 + 3r + 4q
: (62)
We observe that the Markov kernel (61) does not satisfy individual su¢ ciency, in particular, if t1 = t02 =












2 + 3 + 4; (63)


















2 jt1; t2 ) does depend on t1, hence a violation of individual su¢ ciency.
We now show that if S is su¢ cient for S0, then (37) holds. Without loss of generality we can take signal
distribution over three rather than four signals as t = 01 and t = 10 are symmetric. Thus rewriting for the
purpose of this proof
 (j0) t = 00 t = f10; 01g t = 11
r 2 (q   r) 1 + r   2q
 (j1) t = 00 t = f10; 01g t = 11
1 + r   2q 2 (q   r) r
;
as
 (j0) t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
x 1  x  y y
 (j1) t = 0 t = 1 t = 2



























 (t0jt) 0 1 2
0  (0j0)  (1j0)  (2j0)
1  (0j1)  (1j1)  (2j1)
2  (0j2)  (1j2)  (2j2)
3777775 .
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But with the symmetry of (64), it follows from equalities of (66) that we can write the Markov kernel
 (t0jt) as: 2666664
 (t0jt) 0 1 2
0 a  b 1  a b
1 c 1  2c c
2 b 1  a a  b
3777775 ; (67)
with the nonnegativity restrictions:
0  b  a  1, and 0  c  1=2: (68a)
In turn, it follows that if S is su¢ cient for the information structure S0, then from (66) and (67), the
conditional probabilities x0; y0 have to satisfy:
x0 = (a  b  c)x+ (b  c) y + c;
y0 = (a  b  c) y + (b  c)x+ c:
(69)


















2 (1 + 3) ;
(70)
by relabeling






(1 + 3) ;
and requiring that:
1; 2; 3  0 and 1 + 2 + 3  1:



















with weights (1  1   2   3) ; 1; 2; 3 respectively. But given (65), this means in terms of the original









; (q; r) ; (q; q)

,
with the above weights (1  1   2   3) ; 1; 2; 3, hence establishing (37).
(2.) and (3.) We rst show that if (39) holds, then S is a non-communicating ungarbling of S0. This

















+ 3 (q; r) ;
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is independent of tj , and hence that the Markov kernel satises the condition of a non-communicating











22 + 3 and if t
0










22. Now, with given Markov kernel  (t
0jt) we nd that the signal structure













is given by, say t0 = 00 and  = 0 :










1 + 3 (q   r) ;









More generally, we have
0 (j0) 0 1
0 122 + r3
1
21 + (q   r)3
1 121 + (q   r)3
1
22 + (r + 1  2q)3
0 (j1) 0 1
0 122 + (r + 1  2q)3
1
21 + (q   r)3





We now show if S is individually su¢ cient for S0, then condition (38) holds. It then follows from the
denitions of individual su¢ ciency and non-communicating ungarbling that (39) holds as well. After all,
the set of information structures Sq0;r0 for which Sq;r is individually su¢ cient is a superset of the set of
information structures Sq0;r0 for which Sq;r is a non-communicating ungarbling.
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For individual su¢ ciency, the Markov kernel is allowed to depend on , or  (t0jt; ) or  (t0jt) ,
 (t0jt; ). Now by symmetry across states, it will be su¢ cient to establish the argument for  = 0, and so






































is independent of tj . But by symmetry of the information structure, we have
q0 = 0 (00j0) + 0 (01j0)
=  (00j0)0 (00j00) +  (01j0)0 (00j01) +  (10j0)0 (00j10) +  (11j0)0 (00j11) +
 (00j0)0 (01j00) +  (01j0)0 (01j01) +  (10j0)0 (01j10) +  (11j0)0 (01j11)
= r0 (00j00) + (q   r)0 (00j01) + (q   r)0 (00j10) + (r + 1  2q)0 (00j11) +
r0 (01j00) + (q   r)0 (01j01) + (q   r)0 (01j10) + (r + 1  2q)0 (01j11)
= r0i (0j0) + (q   r) 0i (0j0) + (q   r) 0i (0j1) + (r + 1  2q) 0i (0j1)
= q0i (0j0) + (1  q) 0i (0j1) ; (73)
and likewise:
1  q0 = q0i (1j0) + (1  q) 0i (1j1) : (74)












2q 1 , if ti 6= t
0
i:
Thus we can write 0 (t
0jt) as (where t is represents by a row, and t0 by a column) as:
0 (t

















2q 1   y y






2q 1   z z
(75)
In the construction of the Markov kernel (75) we use the symmetry in the information structure across
agents, namely that, e.g.
0 (00j00) + 0 (00j01) = 0 (00j00) + 0 (00j10) .
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Now, non-negativity constraints in the Markov kernel require that:
2q0   1
2q   1  w 
q + q0   1
2q   1
0  x  q   q
0
2q   1




2q   1  z 
q + q0   1
2q   1
Clearly this requires that q  q0; in this case
r0 = 0 (00j0)
=  (00j0)0 (00j00) +  (01j0)0 (00j01) +  (10j0)0 (00j10) +  (11j0)0 (00j11)






Now at the lower bound:








2q   1 ;
whereas at the upper bound:
r
q + q0   1
2q   1 + (q   r)
q   q0
2q   1 + (q   r)
q   q0
2q   1 + (r + 1  2q)

q + q0   1
















r  r0  q   q
0





















reaches the lower bound for 2 = 0 and the upper bound for 1 = 0.
8.3.3 Examples 4 and 5
We establish a lemma which covers the Examples 4 and 5 of Section 5. Let  = f0; 1g and let S be given
by T1 = T2 = f0; 1g with the conditional probabilities:
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which are symmetric across agents and states. However, we compare S with information structures S0,
which may not be symmetric across states. Thus T 01 = T
0
2 = f0; 1g and the conditional probabilities are:
0 (j0) 0 1
0 r0 q   r0
1 q   r0 r0 + 1  2q
0 (j1) 0 1
0 r1 + 1  2q q   r1
1 q   r1 r1
From each agents point of view, the information structure S corresponds to observing one signal with
(symmetric) accuracy 23 , while the second information structure corresponds to observing a signal with
(symmetric) accuracy q. In the information structure S, the playerssignals are as correlated as possible
given the accuracy. In the information structure S0, we allow the correlation to depend on the state.
Non-negativity also requires that (r0; r1) 2 [2q   1; q]2. Thus we have S0 parameterized by
(q; r0; r1)
12  q  1 and (r0; r1) 2 [2q   1; q]2

:
Lemma 11 (Binary Information Structures)








r01   r00  min16 ; 43   2q0

. (77)




is individually su¢ cient for information structure Sq0;r00;r01 if and only if
q0  2
3
and 2q0   1  r00; r01  1  q0. (78)








; 2q0   1  r00; r01  1  q0, and
r00   r01  23   q0. (79)




such that we can express 0 as
0 (j0) 0 1
0 13 ( (00j00) +  (00j01) +  (00j10))
1
3 ( (01j00) +  (01j01) +  (01j10))
1 13 ( (10j00) +  (10j01) +  (10j10))
1
3 ( (11j00) +  (11j01) +  (11j10))
and
0 (j1) 0 1
0 13 ( (00j11) +  (00j01) +  (00j10))
1
3 ( (01j11) +  (01j01) +  (01j10))
1 13 ( (10j11) +  (10j01) +  (10j10))
1
3 ( (11j11) +  (11j01) +  (11j10))
:
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Dening b (t0) , 12 (t0j01) +  (t0j10), we can re-write this as
0 (j0) 0 1
0 13 (00j00) +
2
3
b (00) 13 (01j00) + 23b (01)
1 13 (10j00) +
2
3
b (10) 13 (11j00) + 23b (11)
0 (j1) 0 1
0 13 (00j11) +
2
3
b (00) 13 (01j11) + 23b (01)
1 13 (10j11) +
2
3
b (10) 13 (11j11) + 23b (11)



















































which can be re-written as




On the other hand, if
r00 + 2q





















which can be written as




Thus if r01  r00, it is a necessary condition that either
r00 + 2q
0   1  r01  r00 +
1
6
or r01  min

r00 + 2q
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which implies q0  23 and










The symmetric argument if r00  r01 gives the conditions for su¢ ciency.









= b  t0 = min f0 (t0j0) ; 0 (t0j0)gX
et0
min










  2b  t0 and   t0j11 = 30  t0j1  2b  t0 .
By construction,  (t0j00) and  (t0j11) are well dened and the conditions for su¢ ciency are satised.











































































8<: 3q0   1, if t0i = ti;2  3q0, if t0i 6= ti:
Thus we can write 0 (t
0jt) as
0 (t
0jt) 00 01 10 11
00 x 3q0   1  x 3q0   1  x x+ 3  6q0
01 y 3q0   1  y 2  3q0   y y
10 z 2  3q0   z 3q0   1  z z
Non-negativity constraints require that
6q   3  x  3q   1
0  y  2  3q
0  z  2  3q
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3 (x+ y + z) satises
2q0   1  r0  1  q0.
The symmetric argument implies that
2q0   1  r01  1  q0.
For the converse, obviously if the conditions in (78) are satised, then we can construct 0 according to
the table above. A similar argument would apply for 1.
(3.) Building on the earlier arguments of (1.) and (2.), we must show that there exists  : f0; 1g2 !
f0; 1g2 such that
0 (j0) 0 1
0 13 ( (00j00) +  (00j01) +  (00j10))
1
3 ( (01j00) +  (01j01) +  (01j10))
1 13 ( (10j00) +  (10j01) +  (10j10))
1
3 ( (11j00) +  (11j01) +  (11j10))
0 (j1) 0 1
0 13 ( (00j11) +  (00j01) +  (00j10))
1
3 ( (01j11) +  (01j01) +  (01j10))
1 13 ( (10j11) +  (10j01) +  (10j10))
1












j = 1jti; tj

=
8<: 3q0   1, if t0i = ti;2  3q0, if t0i 6= ti:
So we can represent  by
 (t0jt) 00 01 10 11
00 x 3q0   1  x 3q0   1  x x+ 3  6q0
01 y 3q0   1  y 2  3q0   y y
10 z 2  3q0   z 3q0   1  z z
11 w 2  3q0   w 2  3q0   w w   3 + 6q0
;
where non-negativity constraints imply that
6q0   3  x  3q0   1;
0  y  2  3q0;
0  z  2  3q0;
0  z  2  3q0:
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We want to characterize the set of (r00; r
0





(x+ y + z) and r01 =
1
3
(y + z + w)  1 + 2q0:
By arguments for individual su¢ ciency, we must have 2q0   1  r00; r01  1   q0. But in addition observe
that
y + z = 3r00   x;
and therefore













3r00   3q0 + 1





2  3q0 + 3r00 + 3  6q0









Conversely, suppose that these conditions are satised. (to be completed)
We can then summarize what the conditions of Lemma 11 imply for the case of q0 = 59 . Now, non-
negativity of the conditional probabilities 0 then implies that
1
9




We have that S is su¢ cient for S0 if r01   r00  16 :
We have that S is individually su¢ cient for S0 if
1
9




We have that S is a non-communicating ungarbling of S0 if
1
9
 r00; r01 
4
9
and r01   r00  19 :
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8.3.4 Incomplete Information Correlated Equilibrium
In Section 6, we describe the relationship of the a number of prominent solution concepts to each other
and to the notion of Bayes correlated equilibrium. In particular, we illustrate the relationship within our
leading example of the binary and symmetric game and information structure. These results are graphically
represented in Figure 8 and 9. Here we provide the details of the analytical results for the binary and
symmetric game and information structure.
Feasible Random Choice Rule We recall that we parametrized the symmetric information structure
Sq;r with binary signals by (q; r) and for the purpose of the analysis of the present example we restrict
attention to the information structure with the minimal positive correlation given accuracy q, and hence
r = 2q   1, or Sq;2q 1. We describe the symmetric random choice rule in the binary game by (q0; r0). We
now consider the feasible random choice rules given the information structure Sq;r. It follows directly from
the denition of a feasible random choice rule, Denition 17, and the binary signal that the set of feasible
random choice rules is given by:






























randomized choices over (0; 0) and (1; 1). The remaining feasible random choices represent the case when
each agent either always follows the signal, a = t, namely (q; 2q   1), or never follows the signal, a 6= t,
namely (1  q; 0).
Belief Invariant Bayes Correlated Equilibrium With q  23 , the set of belief invariant Bayes corre-
















; (q; 1  2q)

: (81)
We continue to use parametrization (52). We recall that a decision rule is dened by:
 :  T1  T2 ! (A1 A2) ;
and a belief invariant decision rule, see Denition (16) required that:
i (ai jti; t i;  ) =
X
a i2A i
 (ai; a i jti; t i;  )
is independent of t i and . So, in the binary game it is su¢ cient to consider ai = 0 and ti = 0, then we
have:
x1 + x2
x1 + 2x2 + x5
=
x3 + x4
x3 + x4 + x6 + x7
=
x4 + x7
x3 + x4 + x6 + x7
: (82)
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In other words if we write  for the probability that a player chooses action a if he observes signal t = a,
then:
q0 = q+ (1  q) (1  ),  = q
0 + q   1
2q   1 .
where we note that, by symmetry assumptions, this must be the same for all players and signals. This
gives us the following conditions for belief invariance:
x1 + x2 =

q0 + q   1
2q   1

(x1 + 2x2 + x5) ; (83)
x3 + x4 =

q0 + q   1
2q   1

(x3 + x4 + x6 + x7) ;
x4 + x7 =

q0 + q   1
2q   1

(x3 + x4 + x6 + x7) :
Now, we nd that
x1 + x2 =

q0 + q   1
2q   1

(x1 + 2x2 + x5) , by (83)
=

q0 + q   1
2q   1

(2q   1) ; by (55)
= q0 + q   1;
and thus
x2 = q
0 + q   1  x1
Also
x3 + x6 =

1  q
0 + q   1
2q   1















From (58), we have the requirement that
x2 + x6   x3  0:
Using the above expressions for x2 and x6, we have





(1  q)  x3   x3  0:
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or





(1  q)  x1 + 2x3 = r0:








(q; 2q   1). But we also have
x3 + x4 =

q0 + q   1
2q   1

(x3 + x4 + x6 + x7) , by (83)
=

q0 + q   1
2q   1

(1  q) , (56).























(1  q) , if q0  12 ;
:
and
x1  q0 + q   1;
and thus
r0 = x1 + 2x3 
8<: q





(1  q) , if q0  12 ;





(1  q) , if q0  12 :





















and (q; 2q   1). These lower and upper bounds establish the necessity
of the above conditions.








, the BIBCE is:
 = 0 00 01 10 11
00 13 (2q   1) 0
1
3 (1  q) 0





10 13 (1  q)
1
3 (1  q) 0 0








, the BIBCE is
 = 0 00 01 10 11
00 q   12 0
1
2 (1  q) 0
01 0 q   12 0
1
2 (1  q)
10 12 (1  q) 0 0 0
11 0 12 (1  q) 0 0
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For (q; 2q   1), the BIBCE is the BNE with
 = 0 00 01 10 11
00 2q   1 0 0 1  q
01 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
11 1  q 0 0 0





; (1  q; 1  q) ; (q; q) ; (q; 2q   1) ; (2 (1  q) ; (1  q))

(84)
Now, join feasibility, under our prior symmetric assumptions and the special structure of the experiment,
r = 2q   1, means that the only potentially binding constraint is that:
x3 = x7.
This in turn implies that
2x3 + x4 + x6 = x3 + x4 + x6 + x7 = 1  q;
and thus
2x3 + x4 + x6  1  q:
Also since
x1 + 2x2 + x5 = 2q   1;
we have
x1 + x2  2q   1;
and so
q0 = x1 + 2x3 + x2 + x4 + x6
 2q   1 + 1  q
= q:
Conversely, obedience requires that
2x3  x4 + x6:
Combined with
2x3 + x4 + x6 = 1  q;







q0  1  q:
These two bounds on q0 (1  q  q0  q) together with the BCE restrictions imply that it is necessary for
a Bayesian solution to be in the convex hull described above.
For su¢ ciency, we show that each extreme points corresponds to a Bayesian solution. For
 




 = 0 00 01 10 11
00 0 0 14 (1  q)
1
4 (1  q)
01 0 2q   1 14 (1  q)
1
4 (1  q)
10 14 (1  q)
1
4 (1  q) 0 0
11 14 (1  q)
1
4 (1  q) 0 0
:
For (1  q; 1  q), we have
 = 0 00 01 10 11
00 0 0 12 (1  q) 0
01 0 2q   1 0 12 (1  q)
10 12 (1  q) 0 0 0
11 0 12 (1  q) 0 0
:
For (q; q), we have
 = 0 00 01 10 11
00 2q   1 0 12 (1  q) 0
01 0 0 0 12 (1  q)
10 12 (1  q) 0 0 0
11 0 12 (1  q) 0 0
:
For (q; 2q   1), we have
 = 0 00 01 10 11
00 2q   1 0 0 1  q
01 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
11 1  q 0 0 0
:
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For (2(1  q) ; 1  q), we have
 = 0 00 01 10 11
00 1  q 0 0 1  q
01 0 3q   2 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
11 1  q 0 0 0
:
Belief Invariant Bayesian Solutions It is easy to verify that the extreme points of the set of belief
invariant Bayes correlated equilibria satisfy join feasibility. This means that the set of belief invariant
Bayesian solutions equals the set of belief invariant BCE in the current example.
8.4 More Denitions of Incomplete Information Correlated Equilibrium
We briey discuss how further denitions of incomplete information correlated equilibrium reviewed by
Forges (1993), (2006) appear in our framework. A recent paper of Milchtaich (2012) gives an even richer
taxonomy of possible denitions of incomplete information correlated equilibrium.
Fix (G;S), write Bi for the nite set of pure strategies bi : Ti ! Ai, b for a prole of pure strategies
and B = B1  :::  BI . The following is a feasibility restriction which says that a mediator could have
generated the decision by picking a prole of pure strategies without knowing the state or playerstypes,
and then making action recommendations according to the pure strategies after somehow learning the
playerstypes:
Denition 30 Decision rule  is agent normal form feasible for (G;S) if there exists q 2 (B) such that




One can show that agent normal form feasibility implies belief invariance.9 This restriction is added to
give the second stronger solution concept:
Denition 31 Decision rule  is an agent normal form correlated equilibrium of (G;S) if it is join feasible,
agent normal form feasible (and thus belief invariant) and obedient.
This is the solution concept discussed in Section 4.2 of Forges (1993) and Section 2.3 of Forges (2006). It
corresponds to applying the complete information denition of correlated equilibrium to the agent normal
9Forges (2006) cites an example due to Lehrer, Rosenberg and Shmaya showing that belief invariance does not imply agent
normal form feasibility as incorrectly claimed in Forges (1993).
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form of the reduced incomplete information game. It was also studied by Samuelson and Zhang (1989)
and Cotter (1994). The solution concept only makes sense on the understanding that the players receive
a recommendation for each type but do not learn what recommendation they would have received if they
had been di¤erent types. If they did learn the whole strategy that the mediator choose for them in the
strategic form game, then an extra incentive compatibility condition would be required:
Denition 32 Decision rule  is strategic form incentive compatible for (G;S) if there exists q 2 (V )
such that
 (ajt; ) =
X
fb2Bjbi(ti)=ai for each ig
q (b) (85)
for each a 2 A, t 2 T and  2 ; and, for each i = 1; :::; I, ti 2 Ti, ai 2 Ai and bi 2 Bi such that















1Aui   a0i; a i ; 
Note that this condition implies both agent normal form feasibility and obedience. This restriction
gives the third stronger solution concept:
Denition 33 Decision rule  is a strategic form correlated equilibrium of (G;S) if it is join feasible and
strategic form incentive compatible (and thus agent normal form feasible, belief invariant and obedient).
This is the solution concept discussed in Section 4.1 of Forges (1993) and Section 2.2 of Forges (2006).
This solution concept was studied by Cotter (1991).
Thus far we have simply been adding restrictions, so that the solution concept have become stronger
as we go from Bayesian solution, to belief invariant Bayesian solution, to agent normal form correlated
equilibrium, to strategic form correlated equilibrium. For the Bayesian solution, an omniscient mediator
who observes players types for free is assumed. For agent normal form and strategic form correlated
equilibrium, the playerstypes cannot play a role in the selection of recommendations to the players. An
intermediate assumption is that the players can report their types to the mediator, but will do so truthfully
only if it is incentive compatible to do so.
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Denition 34 Decision rule  is truth telling for (G;S) if, for each i = 1; :::; I and ti 2 Ti, we haveX
a2A;t i2T i;2












ui ((i (ai) ; a i) ; ) ;
for all t0i 2 Ti and i : Ai ! Ai.
Note that this condition implies obedience (Denition 14). One can show that this condition is implied
by strategic form incentive compatibility. Now we have the fth solution concept:
Denition 35 Decision rule  is a communication equilibrium of (G;S) if it is join feasible and truth-
telling (and thus obedient).
This is the solution concept discussed in Section 4.3 of Forges (1993) and Section 2.4 of Forges (2006),
and developed earlier in the work of Myerson (1982) and Forges (1986).
Finally, we discuss the "universal Bayesian approach" in Section 6 of Forges (1993). She considers a
prior "information scheme" (in our language, prior on  and information structure) is not taken as given.
Thus her "universal Bayesian solution" is dened for (Ai; ui)
I
i=1. Expressing her ideas in the language of
random choice rules, she studies the following solution concept.
Denition 36 A prior  2 () and a random choice rule  :  ! (A) for a universal Bayesian
solution of (Ai; ui)
I
i=1 if they satisfy obedience for the the null information structure, i.e., for each i = 1; :::; I
and ai 2 Ai, we have X
a i;











for all a0i 2 Ai.
Thus Bayes correlated equilibria of (G;S) correspond to universal Bayesian solutions of G.
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Illustrations
Figure 1: Single Agent BCE random choice
rule and varying accuracy qone bce
Figure 2: Single Agent BCE, BNE and feasible
random choice rules for accuracy q = 5=8.q5/8
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Figure 3: Single Agent BCE, BNE and feasible
random choice rules for accuracy q = 7=8.q7/8
Figure 4: Binary Symmetric Information
Structures with accuracy q and correlation r.pi
Bayes Correlated Equilibrium February 4, 2013 3
Figure 5: BCE random choice rules for
(q; r) = (2=3; 1=3) and (q; r) = (5=6; 2=3).ai
Figure 6: The set of binary symmetric
information structures for which Sq;r with
(q; r) = (4=6; 3=6) is individually su¢ cient
(IS) and su¢ cient su¢ cient (S [ IS).sis
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Figure 7: The set of asymmetric information
structures Sq0;r00;r01 with q0 = 5=9 for which Sq;r
with (q; r) = (2=3; 1=3) is su¢ cient (S),
individually su¢ cient (IS) and a
non-communicating ungarbling (NCG).sit
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Figure 8: The set of BCE, BIBCE and
feasible random choice rules under Sq;r with
(q; r) = (5=6; 2=3).aj
Figure 9: The set of BCE, BIBCE and Bayes
solution random choice rules under Sq;r with
(q; r) = (5=6; 2=3).ak
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Figure 10: The Solution Conceptsvenn1
Figure 11: More Solution Conceptsvenn2
